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Abstract
With the growing racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. population and work-
force, scholars have begun to address the ways in which coalition building across
groups will continue to be necessary but will become even more complex. The
growing scholarship has focused on analyzing how best to promote effective coali-
tion building. Thus far, scholars have not examined what that growing racial and
ethnic diversity will mean in the individuated context of racial and ethnic discrim-
ination claims. In other words, what will anti-discrimination litigation look like
when all the parties involved are non-White but a racial hierarchy is alleged to
exist nonetheless, and the plaintiffs are not necessarily interested in the group pol-
itics agenda of coalition building.
At the present time, the majority of inter-ethnic employment discrimination claims
that appear in the electronic databases of Westlaw and Lexis appear to be those in
which Latinos are involved alternatively as victims and as agents of discrimina-
tion in the workplace. Latinos are thus the focus of this exploration of inter-ethnic
discrimination. This focus on Latinos is supported by demographic projections
that one in four job seekers will be the child of a Latino immigrant by the year
2020 and that Latino workers will increase their representation in the workforce
from the current rate of 12% to 25% by the year 2050. Furthermore, as the fastest
growing ethnic/racial minority in the U.S., Latinos have been celebrated in the
public discourse as a multiracial people impervious to racial discrimination. Ex-
amining the context of Latino bias may thus have much to tell us about the ability
of legal actors to adequately recognize and articulate the harm of inter-ethnic dis-
crimination claims before a judiciary primarily steeped in an understanding of
discrimination as solely a Black/White phenomenon.
Section I of this Article will present the literature that explicates the complexity of
Latino racial attitudes that is currently under-appreciated by many jurists. Section
II will then analyze the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination
cases. The cases demonstrate a judicial inability to understand racial discrimina-
tion when it occurs in an inter-ethnic context. Furthermore, judges in these cases
are inappropriately creating what this Article terms the Diversity Defense to dis-
crimination allegations. The Diversity Defense describes the way in which legal
actors view a racially diverse workplace as the equivalent of a racially harmonious
workplace. This equivalence is implemented by viewing people of color as all the
same, and overlooking the particular histories of racial animus within and across
different ethnic groups. Section III therefore proposes that legal actors begin to
address the particular litigation needs of inter-ethnic claims through a theory of
functional racism. The Functional Racism Theory that the Article proposes is de-
signed to enable decision makers to more effectively identify the occurrence of
discrimination in inter-ethnic contexts.
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persuasive and unrealistic.1 
 With the growing racial and ethnic diversity of 
the U.S. population and workforce,2 scholars have 
begun to address the ways in which coalition building 
across groups not only will continue to be necessary 
but also will become even more complex.3  Recent 
                     
1
 President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at 
Yale University (June 11, 1962), available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archiv
es/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03Yale06111962.h
tm. 
2
 See Mitra Toosi, A Century of Change: The Labor 
Force, 1950 - 2050, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2002, at 15, 
15 – 16, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/05/art2full.pdf 
(reporting U.S. Department of Labor projections that 
almost half of the workforce of 2050 will be non-
White and non-Anglo, with 24% Latino, 14% African 
American, and 11% Asian or Pacific Islander). 
3
 See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the 
Margin: Blacks and Asians in Mississippi Masala, 
Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7 (1998); 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The 
Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions 
Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759 
(2003); Rogelio A. Lasso, Some Potential Casualties 
of Moving Beyond the Black/White Paradigm To Build 
Racial Coalitions, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 81 
(2005); Robyn K. Mallett, Stacey Sinclair & Jeffrey 
R. Huntsinger, What Intergroup Relations Research Can 
Tell Us About Coalition Building, 12 WASH. & LEE J. 
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 5 (2005); George A. Martínez, 
African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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scholarship has focused on analyzing how best to 
promote effective coalition building.4  Thus far, 
                                                       
Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 UCLA CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 213 (1998); Mary Romero, Afterword: 
Historicizing and Symbolizing a Racial Ethnic 
Identity: Lessons for Coalition Building with a 
Social Justice Agenda, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1599 
(2000); Victor C. Romero, Rethinking Minority 
Coalition Building: Valuing Self-Sacrifice, 
Stewardship, and Anti-Subordination, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
823 (2005); Susan Taing, Lost in the Shuffle: The 
Failure of the Pan-Asian Coalition To Advance the 
Interests of Southeast Asian Americans, 16 LA RAZA 
L.J. 23 (2005); Reynaldo A. Valencia, What If You 
Were First and No One Cared: The Appointment of 
Alberto Gonzales and Coalition Building Between 
Latinos and Communities of Color, 12 WASH. & LEE J. 
C.R. & SOC. JUST. 21 (2005); Adrien Katherine Wing, 
Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race 
Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 
63 LA. L. REV. 717 (2003); Note, The Ties That Bind: 
Coalitions and Governance Under Section 2 Of The 
Voting Rights Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2621 (2004). 
4
 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, African American and 
Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling, 
in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS, AND AFRO-
LATINOS 247, 258 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS] 
(“Because African Americans and Latinas/os suffer 
common harms from racial profiling in law 
enforcement, they would seem natural allies in 
seeking to eliminate the practice.  However, 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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scholars have not examined what that growing racial 
and ethnic diversity will mean in the context of 
individual racial and ethnic discrimination claims.  
What will antidiscrimination litigation look like 
when all the parties involved are non-White5 but 
nonetheless plaintiffs allege that a racial hierarchy 
exists and they are not necessarily interested in the 
group-politics agenda of coalition building?6  This 
                                                       
cooperation between the African American and Latina/o 
communities in the United States faces formidable 
barriers.”). 
5
 Whiteness is treated in this Article as a social 
construct with which a society bestows favored status 
and class privilege upon the individuals referred to 
as White in varying contexts.  See David Roediger, 
Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of “White 
Ethnics” in the United States, in TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF 
WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 
181, 181 - 98 (David Roediger ed., 1994) (describing 
whiteness as a context-based category whose 
assignment is influenced by class and citizenship).  
Because whiteness is not considered a biological fact 
in this analysis, the Article’s discussion of inter-
ethnic discrimination also includes cases in which 
non-Anglo immigrants with fair skin are treated as 
non-White because they are viewed with less favor 
than White-Anglo citizens.  
6
 José E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Legislative 
Settings: The Case of African Americans and Latinos, 
in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 229, 230 
(describing instances of disinterest in the formation 
of coalitions).  
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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Article focuses on the implications of increased 
diversity for the operation of employment 
discrimination law. 
For instance, in a pro se petition alleging 
employment discrimination,7 Mr. Olumuyiwa, a Nigerian 
security guard, asserted that he and African American 
security guards were hired at a lower wage ($7.00 per 
hour) than Latino and Yugoslavian employees ($14.00 
per hour) and received fewer hours than did other 
guards at the discretion of the Hispanic supervisor, 
who said he did not like the plaintiff because he was 
Nigerian.  The supervisor also made overtly 
discriminatory remarks, such as “Why is your black-
ass sleeping here?!  I am going to deduct two hours 
pay from your black-ass paycheck!” and “We Hispanics 
run this office!”  Because the rest of the management 
personnel were also Latino, the plaintiff felt that 
they condoned the supervisor’s poor conduct.  In that 
context, a plaintiff like Mr. Olumuyiwa is likely to 
be most concerned with having any harms he has 
experienced at the hands of a workplace racial 
hierarchy addressed before considering the importance 
of political coalitions with the ethnic group members 
who are comparatively advantaged by that hierarchy.  
Unfortunately, neither the literature about coalition 
building nor the employment discrimination 
jurisprudence is presently capable of addressing the 
problems of inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs 
whose claims are not as extreme in their 
                     
7
 Olumuyiwa v. Harvard Prot. Corp., 1999 WL 529553 
(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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manifestation of overt Latino anti-Black sentiment.8  
 As this Article will explicate, non-White racial 
hierarchies appear opaque to decisionmakers and other 
legal actors, who find it difficult to recognize the 
indicators of discrimination.  Agents of 
discrimination are perceived as uniformly White-
Anglos9 and all incidents are envisioned as having a 
White-versus-non-White dynamic.10  For instance, the 
                     
8
 Id. at *6 (granting plaintiff’s motion to amend 
complaint). 
9
 The term “White-Anglo” is used in this Article to 
distinguish those viewed as White in the United 
States from the many Latinos who also appear 
Caucasian.  In analyzing the interplay of race and 
ethnicity in employment discrimination cases, it is 
important to be specific about the background of the 
parties.  For that same reason the term “African 
American” is used to distinguish those viewed as 
Black in the United States from the many Latinos who 
are also of African descent living in the United 
States.  It is useful to be ethnically specific in 
referring to populations of African descent in order 
to provide a more nuanced account of Latino racism 
that does not conflate identifiable Afro-Latinos with 
Latinos of more prominent European ancestry.  
10
 There is a growing body of literature that 
discusses the various ways in which the legal system 
manifests a view of racism as solely involving 
African Americans and White-Anglos.  The focus of 
that literature has been upon illustrating how the 
Black/White binary obfuscates the operation of White 
racism against many other racial groups.  This 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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Article instead focuses upon how the binary 
obfuscates the racial attitudes of racial group 
members themselves.  See, e.g., Juan Perea, The 
Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal 
Science” of American Racial Thought, 10 CAL. L. REV. 
1213, 1257 (1997) (discussing how the Black/White 
binary focus upon White racism against Blacks does 
not fully explain White racism against other racial 
groups); see also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How 
the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding 
The Language of Title VII Decisions Approving 
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, 
Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA 
RAZA L.J. 261, 261, 268 (1998) (defining “racial 
dualism” as “the tendency of courts to view civil 
rights discourse in terms of Blacks and Whites to the 
exclusion of Browns and other people of color” which 
thereby “makes Latinos and their problems in the 
workplace invisible”); Robert S. Chang, Toward an 
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race 
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993) ("To focus on the black-
white racial paradigm is to misunderstand the 
complicated racial situation in the United States."); 
Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing 
in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 696 (1996) ("An 
historical assessment of the relationship of other 
groups of color to a black/white paradigm reveals the 
paradigm as not only undescriptive and inaccurate, 
but debilitating for legal analysis, as well as civil 
rights oriented organizing."); Angela P. Harris, 
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
fails to collect any data about the race of those 
individuals who are agents of discrimination and 
racial harassment in the workplace.  While this is 
                                                       
L. REV. 741, 775 & n.169 (1994) (“Race-crits’ 
understanding of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ might also 
benefit from looking beyond the struggle between 
black and white.  African American theorists have, 
until now, dominated CRT, and African American 
experiences have been taken as a paradigm for the 
experiences of all people of color.”); Elizabeth 
Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our 
Time, 20 SOC. JUST. 22 (1993); Rachel F. Moran, 
Foreword: Demography and Distrust: The Latino 
Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in 
the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (1995); 
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not 
Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 
- 59 (1995); William R. Tamayo, When the “Coloreds” 
Are Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States 
Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN 
L.J. 1, 7 - 9 (1995); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor 
White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 225, 248 (1995) ("The time 
has come to consider groups that are neither black 
nor white in the jurisprudence of race . . . .  Race 
is conceptualized as breaking down into two all-
encompassing and mutually exclusive categories, black 
and white."); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth 
Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical 
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1181, 1196 (1997) (book review). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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presumably because the EEOC targets discrimination by 
employers, not individuals, the absence of racial 
data about the employers’ representatives implicitly 
furthers the narrative that racism in the United 
States is solely a White/non-White problem.  One EEOC 
attorney has even stated that there has been a 
“reluctance to bring cases against other 
minorities.”11  This reluctance exists even though the 
EEOC is beginning to see more cases in which 
different racial/ethnic groups are set against each 
other in the allocation of job opportunities.12  
                     
11
 Miriam Jordan, Blacks vs. Latinos at Work: More 
African Americans Claim They Are Passed Over for 
Hispanics in Hiring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at B1 
(quoting EEOC regional attorney Anna Park). 
12
 See, e.g., EEOC v. Cloughtery Packing Co., No. 
2:04-cv-08051-GAF-PLA (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005), 
available at http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts 
(settling discrimination claim for $110,000 where 
Black applicants alleged they were denied employment 
so that pork packing employer could hire Latino 
applicants instead); EEOC v. Raytheon Technical 
Servs., No. CV 02-00735 (D. Haw. Nov. 5, 2004), 
available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/index.html 
(settling discrimination claim for $165,000 where 
Black paint contractor allegedly was denied 
employment in favor of Asian/Pacific Islander paint 
contractors); EEOC v. Pac. Micr. Corp. No. 02-0015 
(D. N. Mar. I. Mar. 3 2004), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/index.html 
(settling discrimination claim for $400,000 where 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Indeed, employers generally demonstrate a preference 
for particular racial or ethnic groups in the labor 
market beyond a mere economic preference for low-wage 
immigrant workers.13  For instance, among immigrant 
                                                       
more than forty employees of Filipino origin had been 
replaced by employees from countries other than the 
Philippines); see also Jordan, supra note 11, at B1 
(describing $180,000 EEOC settlement with Zenith 
National Insurance Corp., based upon the allegation 
that ten Black applicants were denied a position in 
the mailroom in favor of a Latino applicant with no 
mailroom experience);  W. Matt Meyer, Here Is a 
Twist--Firm Is Fined for Hiring Too Many Hispanics 
and Not Enough Black and White Workers, Pictsweet To 
Amend for Prejudicial Hiring, HISP. VISTA, July 14, 
2003, at 1 (describing a settlement agreement between 
United Foods Inc. and the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs for 
discrimination in systematically excluding African 
American and White job applicants in favor of hiring 
Latinos).  The preference for Latino workers over 
African Americans may also contribute to the 
disparate unemployment rates that each group suffers.  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that the 
unemployment rate among African Americans is rising 
twice as fast as that of Whites.  In contrast, 
overall Latino unemployment is in line with that of 
the nation as a whole and Latinos have fared better 
with an expansion in manufacturing jobs. Louis 
Uchitelle, Blacks Lose Better Jobs Faster as Middle-
Class Work Drops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at A1. 
13
 PHILIP MOSS & CHRIS TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE, 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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workers, employers prefer those with lighter skin 
tone.14 
Similarly, despite the fact that a significant 
level of overtly anti-Black Latino gang violence 
occurs in the state of California; Chicago, Illinois; 
                                                       
SKILL, AND HIRING IN AMERICA 116 - 17 (2001). The authors 
report racial distinctions made by employers 
regarding the desirability of different racial/ethnic 
group employees in the Russell Sage Foundation Multi-
City Study of Urban Inequality, as demonstrated by 
respondents identifying Latinos six times more 
frequently than African Americans as preferred 
workers.  This attitude is reflected in one 
respondent’s statement that “Spanish people are more 
willing to work.  They are willing to work longer 
hours.  I think the ones that I’ve known are very 
dedicated to their jobs.” See also John J. Betancur, 
Framing the Discussion of African American-Latino 
Relations: A Review and Analysis, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR 
FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 159, 160 (summarizing the 
literature detailing employer preferences for one 
racial group over another with a racial ordering of 
segmented employment roles by status and wage). 
14
 Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: 
The Effects of Skin Color and Height (Vanderbilt Law 
& Econ., Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927038 (noting that a 
2003 study of 8600 recent immigrants found that 
light-skinned immigrants in the United States make 
more money on average than those with darker 
complexions, even when controlling for race and 
nationality). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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and most recently in Perth Amboy, New Jersey,15 the 
FBI’s statistical collection of hate-crime incidents 
fails to provide a mechanism for assessing the number 
of Latino offenders.  Instead, the FBI tabulates 
suspected offenders as White, Black, American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, Multi-
Racial, and Unknown.16  Thus, the existence of Latino 
hate crime perpetrators is statistically invisible 
despite news reports of its occurrence.17  In turn, 
                     
15
 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Effort To Re-
Integrate Jail Sparks New Disturbance, L.A. TIMES, May 
10, 2000, at B4 (reporting three days of rioting 
after Latino inmates, acting on orders from the 
Mexican Mafia prison gang, began attacking African 
American inmates, prompting prison officials to 
segregate the inmates by race, after which the  
Latino inmates refused to be re-integrated with 
African American inmates); Suzanne C. Russell, Perth 
Amboy Gang Tensions Worry Parents, HOME NEWS TRIB., Apr. 
7, 2004 (reporting harassment of African American 
athletes by a Dominican gang of students known as the 
“D Block”). 
16
 See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS OF HATE CRIME (1995),  
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecm.htm. 
17
 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Kareem Fahim, 
Racial Slur Preceded Slashing of 3 in Manhattan, 
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at Metro 37 
(reporting attack on three Asian men by three 
Hispanic men wielding a box cutter and yelling a 
derogatory term for Chinese people); Robert Siegel & 
Melissa Block, All Things Considered:  California 
Prisons on Alert After Weekend Violence (National 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
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the notion that hate crime is solely a White/non-
White phenomenon is maintained.18 
                                                       
Public Radio broadcast Feb. 6, 2006) (reporting two 
weekend race riots between Latino and African 
American inmates, which culminated in prison 
officials segregating the inmates by race and Latino 
inmates sending prison officials a letter that 
stated, “No disrespect . . . but if blacks come in 
the dorms we will fight.”); News Brief, Center for 
the Study of Hate and Extremism, Los Angeles Hate 
Crime Leads to Hijacked Bus, May 3, 2001, available 
at 
http://hatemonitor.csusb.edu/NewsHeadlines/may01_news
_briefs.html#LA%20Hate%20Crime (reporting shooting of 
African American by Latino who stated he did not like 
African American men associating with Latina women);  
see also JAMES E. JOHNSON & BILL LANN LEE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY ET AL., NATIONAL CHURCH ARSON TASK FORCE (1998), 
available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/church_arson/arson98.html 
(reporting arrest of Hispanic suspect for burning an 
African American house of worship).  In addition, 
some municipal arrest records reflect the existence 
of Latino hate crime perpetrators.  See Brian Levin, 
A Dream Deferred, 20 J. INTERGROUP REL. 3, 22 (1993) 
(indicating that 42% of those arrested for racial 
hate crimes in Los Angeles in 1992 were Latino, and 
9% of those arrested for racial hate crimes in Boston 
in 1991 were Latino). 
18
 See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados:  On the Making of 
Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 970 (1995) 
(describing the ways in which the relative lack of 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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As Eric Yamamoto notes, the traditional civil 
rights approach focuses on conflicts with Whites and 
not with other communities of color.19  He also 
observes that the focus on White-Anglos under-
appreciates the extent to which inter-ethnic 
conflicts can quickly escalate into inter-group 
controversies because of the deep and often 
unacknowledged racial grievances.20  Yamamoto 
recommends that in order to build more effective 
coalitions, civil rights attorneys should envision 
racial justice practice as something more than the 
enforcement of civil rights laws.  They should 
instead deploy interracial justice inquiries in the 
venue of grassroots organizing in order to 
acknowledge how racial groups harm one another.  
Yamamoto’s work, however, does not examine the focus 
of this Article:  the development of a conceptual 
framework for effectively presenting and 
understanding inter-ethnic discrimination claims with 
the goal of disrupting the judiciary’s singular focus 
on White/non-White discrimination.   
This Article treats “inter-ethnic 
discrimination” as discrimination among non-White 
                                                       
positive public identity and legitimacy of Latinos 
creates an image of racial conflict as existing 
solely between African Americans and White-Anglos). 
19
 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & 
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 38 (1999). 
20
 See Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical 
Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, 
AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 386 (Francisco Valdes 
et al. eds., 2002). 
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racial and ethnic groups.  The concept is defined 
broadly to include discrimination among members of 
different ethnic subgroups, such as discrimination by 
Puerto Ricans against Dominicans or by White Latinos 
against Afro-Latinos.  Inter-ethnic discrimination is 
viewed expansively in order to depict the many ways 
non-White ethnic groups and subgroups are complicit 
in maintaining racial hierarchy in the workplace.  
Thus, the classic disparate treatment employment 
discrimination cases, in which White employers 
exclude or differentially treat particular 
racial/ethnic groups, are not part of this 
examination of inter-ethnic discrimination.21  
                     
21
 See supra note 12 (detailing cases in which the 
EEOC has successfully settled allegations of White 
employers awarding job opportunities to one 
racial/ethnic group at the expense of another).  
While the EEOC often is able to settle classic 
disparate treatment cases involving White employers, 
plaintiffs have met with judicial resistance when 
they allege disparate treatment by White employers 
who rely on word-of-mouth hiring methods that 
disproportionately exclude African Americans while 
overwhelmingly including other racial/ethnic groups.  
But see EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 
292, 298 – 99 (7th Cir. 1991) (observing that 
exclusionary word-of-mouth hiring methods can support 
a finding of discrimination when an employer is 
actively involved in soliciting employees for word-
of-mouth applicant recommendations).  The Seventh 
Circuit later upheld a judgment of discrimination by 
a Polish employer who used word-of-mouth recruitment 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Furthermore, the dearth of reported cases involving 
systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact in 
the inter-ethnic context precludes the specific 
examination of those forms of discrimination in this 
Article’s analysis of inter-ethnic discrimination.22  
                                                       
practices that benefited Polish and Latino employees 
while completely excluding African American 
applicants. EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty 
Co., 38 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 1994).  This result 
accords with the general understanding that word-of-
mouth recruitment policies creating a predominantly 
White workforce or job category can establish a 
discrimination violation.  See, e.g., Grant v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 
1975). 
22
 In one noteworthy systemic disparate treatment 
inter-ethnic discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the passive use of word-of-mouth 
recruitment by the Korean owner of a janitorial and 
cleaning services company could not in and of itself 
give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination in the absence of evidence that the 
owner was biased in favor of Koreans or prejudiced 
against any group underrepresented in its work force.  
EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 
1993).  Although this case has been assailed for 
underestimating the discriminatory effects of intra-
ethnic group preferences in the workplace, it should 
be noted that unlike the disposition of the emerging 
individual disparate treatment inter-ethnic cases 
analyzed in this Article, Consolidated Service does 
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The majority of inter-ethnic employment 
discrimination claims appear to be those in which 
Latinos are involved alternatively as victims and as 
agents of individual disparate treatment in the 
workplace.23  Latinos and individual disparate 
treatment cases are thus the focus of this 
exploration of inter-ethnic discrimination.24  This 
focus is warranted by demographic projections that 
one in four job seekers by the year 2020 will be the 
child of a Latino immigrant and that Latino workers 
will increase their representation in the workforce 
from the current rate of 12% to 25% by the year 
2050.25  Latino-owned businesses have also increased 
                                                       
not foreclose the possibility that racial 
discriminatory intent might exist simply because the 
company owner is Korean.  Indeed, the court took 
pains to note that the assessment of the case would 
have been different if evidence of racial animus had 
been presented or if the owner had been actively 
engaged in deploying the word-of-mouth hiring method 
rather than passively benefiting from his employees’ 
self-initiated use of the method. Id. at 236. 
23
 See infra note 125 and accompanying text (detailing 
the inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases in 
LexisNexis and Westlaw). 
24
 See infra notes 125 - 131 and accompanying text 
(describing the nature of an individual disparate 
treatment case and its importance to the emerging 
inter-ethnic discrimination cases).   
25
 Employment: Second-Generation Latinos To Exert 
Major Workforce Influence, Pew Report Says, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 199, at A-7 (Oct. 15, 2003); see 
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232% between 1987 and 1997.26  In 1997 alone, Latino-
owned businesses employed 1,492,773 people.27  
Furthermore, as the fastest-growing28 ethnic/racial 
minority29 in the United States, Latinos have been 
celebrated in the public discourse as a multiracial 
people incapable of racial discrimination.30  
                                                       
also RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINO LABOR REPORT 
2006: STRONG GAINS IN EMPLOYMENT (2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/70.pdf. 
26
 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., MINORITIES IN BUSINESS 1 (1999), 
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/min.pdf. 
27
 Id. at 23. 
28
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: MARCH 2002, at 20-545 (2003), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-545.pdf 
(reporting that the nation’s Hispanic population grew 
much faster than the population as a whole, 
increasing from 35.3 million in 2000 to 38.8 million 
in 2002, and constituted 12.5% of the 2000 census 
population, excluding the 3.8 million residents of 
Puerto Rico).  The Latino population is projected to 
constitute one quarter of the U.S. population by 
2050. Dick Kirschten, Hispanics: Beyond the Myths, 
NAT’L. J., Aug. 14, 1999, at 2350, 2351. 
29
 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: 
The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
1143 (1997) (describing how Latinos can be positioned 
to be both an ethnic group and a racial group). 
30
 See Silvio Torres-Saillant, Inventing the Race: 
Latinos and the Ethnoracial Pentagon, 1 LATINO STUD. J. 
123 (2003) (describing how Latinos take pride in 
being enlightened about race relations because they 
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Examining Latino bias may tell us much about the 
ability of legal actors to recognize and articulate 
the harm of inter-ethnic discrimination in a legal 
system steeped in an understanding of discrimination 
as solely a White/non-White phenomenon. 
In the emerging body of inter-ethnic 
discrimination cases, Latinos figure prominently in 
allegations of employment discrimination in ways that 
contradict the image in public discourse of a 
multiracial people who do not racially discriminate.  
In these cases, judges seem unable to appreciate 
Latino manifestations of bias for two reasons.  
First, judges appear to be unfamiliar with Latin 
American racial ideology and how Latinos in the 
United States express racial bias.  Second, they 
                                                       
are a “racially mixed” people); Silvio Torres-
Saillant, Epilogue: Problematic Paradigms: Racial 
Diversity and Corporate Identity in the Latino 
Community, in LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 435 (M.M. Suarez-
Orozco & M.M. Paez eds., 2002) [hereinafter Torres-
Saillant, Problematic Paradigms] (discussing the 
dangers of “current assertions of a harmonious 
panethnic Latino identity”);  see also JOHN FRANCIS 
BURKE, MESTIZO DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF CROSSING BORDERS 
(2002) (arguing that the Latino “mestizaje” mixed 
race experience offers an ideal model for fostering 
unity); Lynette Clemetson, Hispanic Population Is 
Rising Swiftly, Census Bureau Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 
19, 2003, at A22 (“[Latinos] just don’t see the world 
divided into such stark boxes, and that has to be a 
real engine for change.” (quoting Roberto Suro, 
director of the Pew Hispanic Institute)). 
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impute to diverse workplaces a shield against 
discriminatory treatment claims.  This is best 
exemplified by one judge’s explicit claim that 
“[d]iversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an 
inference of discriminatory intent.”31  Such a 
presumption both contravenes established employment 
discrimination doctrine and impairs a thorough 
inquiry into inter-ethnic employment discrimination 
claims.  Indeed, it effectively operates as a defense 
to discrimination in individual disparate treatment 
cases when an accusation of inter-ethnic 
discrimination is at issue.   
This Article uses the term “diversity defense” 
to describe the way in which legal actors view a 
racially “diverse” workplace as the equivalent of a 
racially harmonious workplace, thereby failing to 
recognize incidents of discrimination and the 
relevant case law.  Viewing all people of color as 
the same and overlooking the particular histories of 
racial animus within and across different ethnic 
groups can cause a perceived equivalence of workplace 
diversity and racial harmony.  The lack of judicial 
knowledge about non-White racial hierarchies 
generally, and Latino ethnic/racial differences and 
attitudes specifically, facilitates the inclination 
to construct a diversity defense.  Then, in a 
circular fashion, the diversity defense hinders 
judicial awareness of Latino heterogeneity and inter-
ethnic strife.  In response, this Article proposes a 
“Multiracial Racism Litigation Approach” (“MRLA”) to 
                     
31
 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 
2004). 
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enable decision-makers to identify and address 
discrimination in inter-ethnic contexts. 
Part I of this Article will present the social 
science literature illuminating the complexity of 
racial attitudes among Latinos, which judges 
generally do not appreciate.  Part II will analyze 
the emerging Latino inter-ethnic employment 
discrimination cases.  These cases demonstrate that 
judicial inability to recognize racial discrimination 
when it occurs in an inter-ethnic context leads 
judges to deploy an inappropriate diversity defense 
to discrimination claims.  Part III therefore 
proposes that legal actors address the particular 
litigation needs of inter-ethnic claims through a 
multiracial racism lens.  The proposed MRLA focuses 
on how an ethnic/racial group is advantaged or 
disadvantaged depending on the context.  As such, it 
is better able to elucidate and address the harms of 
inter-ethnic employment discrimination, without 
imputing magical powers to the existence of workplace 
diversity. 
I. LATINO RACIAL ATTITUDES 
 Before presenting the emerging Latino inter-
ethnic discrimination cases, it is important to 
explore the social science data about Latino racial 
attitudes that judges have overlooked.  With a 
foundation in the social science literature, one can 
more clearly appreciate the missteps of the cases. 
A. The Origins of Latino Racism 
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The manifestation of Latino racism in the United 
States is the result of a complex interaction of 
Latin American/Caribbean racial attitudes and self-
esteem-boosting responses to being racialized as 
Latinos in the United States.  Most relevant for this 
analysis of inter-ethnic employment discrimination is 
the interplay of Latino anti-Black racial attitudes.32  
They are most relevant because the emerging inter-
ethnic Latino cases discussed herein involve 
workplace settings in which Latinos are identified as 
                     
32
 Latino anti-Asian bias is an under-studied area 
that warrants empirical research.  Just a few 
scholars have begun to address the issue of Asian 
ethnicity in Latin America.  See JEFFREY LESSER, 
NEGOTIATING NATIONAL IDENTITY:  IMMIGRANTS, MINORITIES AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR ETHNICITY IN BRAZIL (1999); Evelyn Hu Dehart, 
Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth 
Century: Free Labour or Neo-Slavery?, in THE WAGES OF 
SLAVERY 67, 68 - 70 (Michelle Twaddle ed., 1993); Mieko 
Nishida, Japanese Brazilian Women and Their Ambiguous 
Identities:  Gender, Ethnicity and Class in Sao Paulo 
(Latin Am. Stud. Ctr., Univ. of Md., College Park, 
Working Paper No. 5, 2000).  In contrast, prejudice 
against those of indigenous ancestry in Latin America 
is well documented in social science literature.  
See, e.g., STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA (Susan 
Eva Eckstein & Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2002) 
(detailing the indigenous peoples’ struggle against 
discrimination in Latin America).  However, neither 
anti-Asian nor anti-indigenous bias has been 
implicated in the emerging Latino inter-ethnic 
employment discrimination cases reported thus far. 
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agents of anti-Black bias and discrimination against 
African Americans and Afro-Latinos.  Presented with 
these cases, judges are often unable to recognize the 
details of Latino anti-Black racial discrimination, 
despite their willingness to entertain claims of 
anti-Latino bias made by African Americans.33  
It is useful to first summarize Latin American 
and Caribbean perspectives about Afro-Latinos, that 
is, their own Afro-descendants, before discussing how 
those perspectives inform Latino attitudes toward 
African Americans in the United States.  The 
                     
33
 It may well be that the apparent judicial 
predisposition to consider the culpability of Black 
defendants in anti-Latino bias employment claims is 
part and parcel of the general proclivity for more 
readily accepting the possible culpability of Black 
defendants in contrast to other racial groups.  See, 
e.g., Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of 
African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of 
Laws:  In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 721 (2004).  Therefore, while inter-ethnic cases 
of anti-Latino bias do exist, they have not thus far 
led to judicial confusion in the inquiry into 
discrimination and are therefore not the subject of 
this Article.  See, e.g., Limes-Miller v. City of 
Chicago, 773 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(dismissing claim of Latina plaintiff who failed to 
show that her employer’s stated reason for layoffs 
was a pretext for national-origin discrimination in 
an inter-ethnic workplace in which plaintiff failed 
to prove that Blacks were promoted at higher rates 
than others). 
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presentation of Latin American race ideology is not 
at all meant to suggest that all Latinos are racist 
or harbor these racialized perspectives.  Admittedly, 
group-focused discussions always run the risk of 
suggesting an essentialized view of a group.34  This 
data about Latino racial perspectives is provided to 
demonstrate the nature of Latino racial stereotypes 
of which legal actors in the United States may 
otherwise be ignorant and which they must understand 
in order to recognize the discriminatory conduct of 
Latinos who act upon such stereotypes.35   
It is not intended to insinuate that all Latinos 
think a particular way. 
Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a 
pervasive and historically entrenched fact of life in 
                     
34
 An essentialized approach to understanding groups 
is marked by the notion that human identity 
categories are fixed and exist trans-historically and 
transculturally.  See Cheshire Calhoun, 
Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay 
Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (1993). 
35
 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) (concluding that an employer’s expressions of 
stereotypical views about a protected group such as 
women could be admitted as evidence that an adverse 
employment decision was impermissibly motivated);   
see also Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian 
Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.  
57, 95 (1994) (proposing the use of essentialized 
notions of culture in criminal law cases for the 
limited purpose of explaining an individual’s state 
of mind and cultural influences). 
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Latin America and the Caribbean.  Over 90% of the 
approximately ten million enslaved Africans brought 
to the Americas were taken to Latin America and the 
Caribbean, whereas only 4.6% were brought to the 
United States.36  As such, the historical legacy of 
slavery is pervasive in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  In Latin America and the Caribbean, as in 
the United States, lighter skin and European features 
increase one’s chances for socioeconomic advancement, 
while darker skin and African or indigenous features 
severely limit such opportunity and social mobility.37  
The poorest socioeconomic class is populated 
primarily by Afro-Latinos, while the most privileged 
class is populated primarily by Whites; an elastic 
intermediary socioeconomic standing exists for some 
light-skinned (mixed-race) “Mulattos” and 
“Mestizos.”38  For instance, until the Cuban 
revolution in 1959, certain occupations used explicit 
color preferences to hire Mulattos to the complete 
exclusion of dark-skinned Afro-Cubans, based on the 
premise that Mulattos were superior to dark-skinned 
Afro-Cubans, though not of the same status as 
                     
36
 Miriam Jimenez Román, Un Hombre (Negro) del Pueblo: 
José Celso Barbosa and the Puerto Rican “Race” Toward 
Whiteness, 8 CENTRO 8, 12 (1996). 
37
 Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracial Matrix: The 
Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of 
Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States – Latin 
America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1121 - 22  
(2002) [hereinafter Hernández, Multiracial Matrix]. 
38
 Id. at 1121 - 25. 
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Whites.39 
White supremacy is deeply ingrained and 
continues into the present.  For example, in research 
conducted in Puerto Rico during the 1997 - 1998 
academic year, the overwhelming majority of the 187 
college students interviewed described “Puerto Ricans 
who are ‘dumb’ as having ‘dark skin.’”40  Conversely, 
the same students correlated light skin color with a 
description of “Puerto Ricans who are physically 
strong.”  Such negative perspectives about African 
ancestry are not limited to college students.  In 
1988, when the presiding governor of Puerto Rico 
publicly stated, “The contribution of the black race 
to Puerto Rican culture is irrelevant, it is mere 
rhetoric,” it was in keeping with what social 
scientists describe as the standard paradox in Puerto 
Rico:  Puerto Ricans take great pride in the claim of 
being the whitest people of the Caribbean islands, 
while simultaneously asserting they are not racist.  
The pride of being a presumably White population is a 
direct reaction to the Puerto Rican understanding 
that “black people are perceived to be culturally 
unrefined and lack ambition.”41  The Puerto Rican 
                     
39
 Tanya K. Hernández, An Exploration of the Efficacy 
of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: The 
Cuban Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135 (2000). 
40
 Ronald E. Hall, A Descriptive Analysis of Skin 
Color Bias in Puerto Rico: Ecological Applications to 
Practice, 27 J. SOC’Y. & SOC. WELFARE 171, 177 - 78 
(2000). 
41
 Arlene Torres, La Gran Familia Puertorriqueña “Ej 
Preta De Beldá” (The Great Puerto Rican Family is 
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example is emblematic of the racial attitudes 
throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.42 
As in the United States, the disparagement of 
Black identity is not limited to Mulattos, Mestizos, 
and Whites, but also extends to darker-skinned Afro-
Latinos who can harbor internalized racist norms.  
The internalization manifests itself in a widespread 
concern among Afro-Latinos with the degree of 
pigmentation, width of nose, thickness of lips, and 
nature of one’s hair -– with straight, European hair 
denominated literally as “good” hair.  This concern 
with European skin and features also influences Afro-
Latinos’ assessments of preferred marriage partners.  
Marrying someone lighter is called “adelantando la 
raza” (improving the race) under the theory of 
“blanqueamiento” (whitening), which prizes the 
mixture of races precisely to help diminish the 
existence of Afro-Latinos.  Even in the midst of 
Latin American nationalistic emphasis on having 
individuals identify solely by their country of 
origin rather than by racial ancestry, discursive 
distinctions are made about the diminished value of 
Blacks and blackness.  Indeed, it is even common 
                                                       
Really Really Black), in BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN:  SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, VOL. II, 
EASTERN SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 285, 297 (Arlene 
Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr. eds., 1998).   
42
 Ariel E. Dulitzky, A Region in Denial:  Racial 
Discrimination and Racism in Latin America, in NEITHER 
ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 41 - 42 (describing 
the anti-Black racism that exists throughout Latin 
America). 
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within Latin America and the Caribbean to rank order 
the prestige of countries based on a color spectrum 
in which each country is racially identified.43  In 
this way “nationality is a proxy for race” that 
embodies White supremacy.44  As a result, countries 
with a large percentage of Whites are valued while 
those with a large percentage of Blacks are 
discounted as “less cultured.”45  The attribution of a 
                     
43
 Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas, 
Professor of Latino & Hispanic Caribbean Studies, 
Rutgers Univ. (March 1, 2007); see also Francisco 
Valdes, Race, Ethnicity, and Hispanismo in a 
Triangular Perspective:  The “Essential Latino/a” and 
LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305, 326 (2000) 
(describing the racialization of Latin America and 
“the supremacy of whiteness and Eurocentricity in 
Latina/o racial and ethnic hierarchies -– both in 
Latin American societies and in Latina/o communities 
throughout the United States”).  One scholar refers 
to racial identification of countries as “primacism.”  
See Benjamin G. Davis, International Commercial 
Online and Offline Dispute Resolution: Addressing 
Primacism and Universalism, 4 J. AM. ARB. 79, 81 (2005) 
(“The word primacism is my manner of describing the 
situation where race, culture, and nationality are 
intertwined in such a manner that while one speaks in 
terms of nationality, in fact, one is describing race 
(or some other primary group).”).   
44
 Davis, supra note 43, at 81. 
45
 Hernández, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37, at 
1160 (“[T]he examination of the Latin American 
context has shown how existing racial disparities and 
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racial identity to countries, with nationality 
serving as a proxy for race, also permits a 
schizophrenic ability to cast racial aspersions about 
a person’s background without ever openly discussing 
race.  These proxies for race are deeply ingrained in 
Latin American/Caribbean culture.46 
It should not be surprising, then, that migrants 
from Latin America and the Caribbean travel to the 
United States with their culture of anti-Black racism 
well intact.47  In turn, this facet of Latino culture 
is transmitted to some degree to younger 
generations.48  For instance, in one ethnographic 
                                                       
hierarchy are explained as the result of the ‘bad 
culture’ that racial minorities manifest.”);  see 
also Paulo de Carvalho-Neto, Folklore of the Black 
Struggle in Latin America, 5 LATIN AM. PERSP. 53, 58 – 
62, 71 (1978) (detailing the ways in which Latin 
American folklore publicly depicts Blacks in Latin 
America as ill mannered and stupid).  “To the 
prejudiced white man, the black man has no artistic 
or literary education.”  Id. at 62.  
46
 Telephone Interview with Ana Y. Ramos Zayas, supra 
note 43.  
47
 Paula D. McClain et al., Racial Distancing in a 
Southern City: Latino Immigrants’ Views of Black 
Americans, 68 J. POL. 571 (2006) (documenting how 
Latino immigrants bring negative attitudes towards 
Blacks with them from their countries of origin 
rather than develop them in the United States after 
immigrating); Torres-Saillant, Problematic Paradigms, 
supra note 30, at 435 - 55. 
48
 See Valdes, supra note 43, at 307 (observing the 
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study of Dominican racial identity within the United 
States, all of the Dominican preoccupations with skin 
color and European phenotype honed in the Dominican 
Republic were readily apparent among the Dominican 
Diaspora in the United States.49  Furthermore, 
interviews of Dominican clients at a hair salon in 
Washington Heights, New York, demonstrated the 
pervasive Latin American/Caribbean racialized 
denigration of curly African hair as “bad” and 
straight European hair as “good,” along with the 
distaste for dark skin.50 
The inability to perceive Latino racism in the 
United States stems from an acceptance in U.S. public 
discourse of the Latin American myth that racism does 
not exist in Latin America51 and that racism is thus 
not part of the Latino migrant legacy across 
generations.52  In turn, Latinos and the scholars who 
describe their racial attitudes tend to accept the 
notion that any anti-Black sentiment expressed by 
Latinos in the United States is a consequence of 
learning the cultural norms of the United States and 
its racial paradigm.53  However, a growing social 
                                                       
“internal reproduction of white supremacy within and 
among Latinas/os”). 
49
 See Ginetta E.B. Candelario, Situating Ambiguity: 
Dominican Identity Formations 360 - 80 (2000) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of 
New York) (on file with author).  
50
 Id. at 339. 
51
 Dulitzky, supra note 42, at 39.   
52
 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
53
 See, e.g., TATCHO MINDIOLA, JR. ET AL., BLACK-BROWN 
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science literature discredits the premise that Latino 
racism is a set of behaviors and attitudes only 
learned on the United States mainland.54 
B. The Extent of Latino Social Distance from African 
Americans 
 The sociological concept of “social distance” 
measures the social unease that an ethnic or racial 
group has in interactions with another ethnic or 
racial group.55  Social science studies of Latino 
racial attitudes often indicate a preference for 
maintaining social distance from African Americans.  
And while the social distance level is largest for 
recent Latin American immigrants, more established 
communities of Latinos in the United States are also 
characterized by their social distance from African 
Americans.  For instance, in a 2002 survey of 600 
Latinos (two-thirds of whom were Mexican, the 
                                                       
RELATIONS AND STEREOTYPES 20 - 29, 37 - 38 (2002). 
54
 See Valdes, supra note 43, at 328 (“Latina/o 
tendencies to valorize whiteness are not simply a 
matter of acculturation, or even reacculturation, to 
the Anglocentric white supremacist rule imposed by 
the United States.”);  see also Tanya Katerí 
Hernández, To Be Brown in Brazil: Education and 
Segregation Latin American Style, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 683 (2005) (describing the literature 
documenting the existence of residential and 
educational racial segregation in Latin America). 
55
 GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?  LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW 
BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE 65 (2003). 
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remainder Salvadorian and Colombian) and 600 African 
Americans in Houston, Texas, the African Americans 
had more positive views of Latinos than vice versa.56 
While a slim majority of U.S. born Latinos did use 
positive identifiers when describing African 
Americans, only a minority of foreign-born Latinos 
did so.  One typical foreign-born Latino respondent 
stated “I just don’t trust them . . . .  The men, 
especially, all use drugs and they all carry guns . . 
. .”
57
  It is thus not surprising that this same study 
found that, although Latino immigrants live in 
residential neighborhoods with African Americans in 
the same proportion as U.S.-born Latinos, 46% of 
Latino immigrants report almost no interaction with 
African Americans whatsoever.58  Similarly, the Los 
Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality found that recent 
and intermediate-term Latino immigrants held the most 
negative stereotypes of African Americans.59 
Furthermore, the social distance of Latinos from 
African Americans is consistently reflected in Latino 
responses to other survey questions.60  In a 2003 
survey of five hundred residents of Durham, North 
Carolina (equally divided among Latinos, African 
Americans, and White-Anglos), researchers found that 
                     
56
 MINDIOLA, JR., supra note 53, at 35. 
57
 Id. at 35. 
58
 Id. at 44 - 45. 
59
 CAMILLE ZUBRINSKY CHARLES, WON’T YOU BE MY NEIGHBOR?  RACE, 
CLASS, AND RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES 161 (2006) (describing 
the results from the 1992 - 1994 Los Angeles Survey 
of Urban Inequality). 
60
 Id. at 46. 
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Latinos’ negative stereotypes of African Americans 
exceed those held by White-Anglos.61  A 2000 study of 
residential segregation found that Latinos reject 
African Americans as neighbors more readily than 
members of other racial groups do.62  In addition, the 
1999 - 2000 Lilly Survey of American Attitudes and 
Friendships indicated that African Americans were the 
least desirable marriage partners for Latinos, 
whereas African Americans are more accepting of 
intermarriage with Latinos.63  
                     
61
 See McClain, supra note 47 (observing that a 
majority of Latino immigrants in the study -- 58.9% -
- said that few or almost no African Americans are 
hardworking, 57% said few if any African Americans 
could be trusted, and nearly one third said few if 
any African Americans are easy to get along with; for  
White-Anglos, 9.3% said few African Americans work 
hard, 9.6% said African Americans could not be 
trusted, and 8.4% said African Americans were 
difficult to get along with). 
62
 Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-
Composition Preferences: Evidence from a Multiethnic 
Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379 (2000). 
63
 YANCEY, supra note 55, at 70 - 71 (describing the 
study of group-based racial attitudes but not 
delineating which ethnic groups made up the composite 
of “Latinos” in the study respondents);  see also 
Roger Lindo, Miembros de las Diversas Razas Prefieren 
a los Suyos:  Así lo Afirma una Investigación de la 
Universidad de California de Los Angeles, LA OPINION, 
Nov. 20, 1992, at 1C (describing UCLA study 
indicating Latino social distance from African 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 34 
 
 
Similarly, in a 1993 study of inter-group 
relations, Latinos overwhelmingly responded that they 
had most in common with Whites and least in common 
with African Americans.64  In contrast, African 
Americans responded that they felt they had more in 
common with Latinos and least in common with Whites 
and Asian Americans.  It is somewhat ironic that 
African Americans, who are publicly depicted as being 
averse to coalition building with Latinos, provide 
survey responses that are actually more in accord 
with all the socioeconomic data that demonstrates the 
commonality of African American and Latino 
communities.65  Meanwhile, Latinos in 
                                                       
Americans); Cynthia Orosco, Aprender a Convivir: 
Negros e Hispanos, LA OPINION, Apr. 14, 2001, at 9A 
(describing a study by Hispanic Link regarding Latino 
relations with African Americans in North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee).  
64
 NAT’L CONFERENCE FOR CMTY. JUSTICE, TAKING AMERICA’S PULSE:  
THE FULL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE SURVEY ON INTER-GROUP 
RELATIONS (1994).  
65
 See Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Too Black to be 
Latino/a:” Blackness and Blacks as Foreigners in 
Latino Studies, 1 LATINO STUD. 152, 154 (2003) 
(“Current discussions about the demographic explosion 
of Latinos/as and their desire to assume greater 
political clout has focused upon the presumed 
obstructionism and discontent of Anglo-Blacks who 
must ‘relinquish’ their power to accommodate 
Latinos/as.”);  see also Alex Prud’homme, Race 
Relations Browns vs. Blacks, TIME, July 29, 1991, at 
14 - 16 (identifying the source of Black-Latino 
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contradistinction provide survey responses that fly 
in the face of all the socioeconomic data 
demonstrating African American and Latino parallels.66  
 Although some commentators might equate the 
Latino preference for White-Anglos over African 
Americans with the competition they perceive from 
African Americans in the labor market, a 1996 
sociological study of racial group competition 
indicates otherwise.67  In the study of 477 Latinos 
                                                       
hostilities as African Americans’ beliefs that 
“Latinos are benefiting from civil rights victories 
won by blacks with little help from Hispanics,” “fear 
that Hispanic immigrants, who are often willing to 
work less than the legal minimum wage, are 
supplanting them in even the lowliest positions,” and 
resistance to “any attempts to increase Latino 
employment” and being “unwilling to treat [Latinos] 
as equals in the fight for equal rights”). A recent 
book about Black-Latino hostilities has been 
criticized for being one-sided in its blame of 
African Americans: “The villains invariably turn out 
to be African-Americans, who are threatened by 
demographic changes and shut Latinos out of political 
office, while refusing to acknowledge that anyone’s 
suffering could ever be as great as theirs.” Ed 
Morales, Brown Like Me?, THE NATION, Mar. 8, 2004, at 
24. 
66
 BILL PIATT, BLACK AND BROWN IN AMERICA: THE CASE FOR 
COOPERATION 52 - 57 (1997) (detailing the socioeconomic 
factors that align Latino and African American 
interests). 
67
 Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions 
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from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, Bobo 
and Hutchings found that prejudice contributes to 
perceptions of group threat and economic competition. 
They also found that the greater the social distance 
Latinos prefer to maintain from African Americans, 
the more likely they are to see African Americans as 
competitors.68  In other words, the anti-Black 
animosity facilitates the perception of African 
Americans as an economic threat.  Yet despite media 
reports to the contrary, the Bobo and Hutchings study 
indicated a lower rate of African American perception 
of economic competition from Latinos, as compared 
with the rate of Latino perception of economic threat 
from African Americans.69  Similarly, Latinos 
attribute disorder to predominantly African American 
neighborhoods much more readily than do other 
racial/ethnic groups.  A study published in 2004 
demonstrated that neighborhood racial context in 
Chicago shapes perceptions of disorder more 
powerfully than actual observations of disorder.70  
The Latino affinity for White-Anglos over 
African Americans is part and parcel of the Latino 
                                                       
of Racial Group Competition:  Extending Blumer’s 
Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social 
Context, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 951 (1996).   
68
 Id. at 963. 
69
 Id. at 964. 
70
 Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing 
Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social 
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 
319, 332 – 33, 336 (2004) (summarizing findings of 
study of five hundred block groups in Chicago). 
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identification with whiteness.  Indeed, in contrast 
to the many reports of a Latino preference for mixed-
race census racial categories, there is a strong 
Latino preference for the White racial category and 
some Latino groups like Cubans disproportionately 
select the White racial category.71  Moreover, the 
Latino National Political Survey, a study of Latino 
racial preferences across generations in the United 
States from 1989 to 1990, found that a substantial 
majority of Latino respondents chose to self-identify 
as White.72  It is important to note that the Latino 
National Political Survey study was able to examine 
the preference for whiteness divorced from any 
ancillary effects that variation in census racial 
category structures can include.73  The study 
                     
71
 William Darity, Jr., Darrick Hamilton & Jason 
Dietrich, Passing on Blackness: Latinos, Race and 
Earnings in the USA, 9 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 847 (2002). 
72
 William Darity, Jr. & Tanya Golash Boza, Choosing 
Race: Evidence from the Latino National Political 
Survey 4 - 5 (2004), available at 
http://paa2004.princeton.edu/download.asp?submissioni
d=41644 (discussing findings from study of Mexican 
American, Cuban, and Puerto Rican respondents in the 
United States); see also William A. Darity, Jr. et 
al., Bleach in the Rainbow:  Latino Ethnicity and 
Preference for Whiteness, 13 TRANSFORMING ANTHROPOLOGY 103 
(2005). 
73
 A Hispanic–origin ethnicity category was not added 
to the list of racial categories on the census until 
1980.  See Transfer of Responsibility for Certain 
Statistical Standards from OMB to Dep’t of Commerce, 
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indicated that the White racial category is 
particularly preferred by recent immigrants of all 
skin color shades.74  And when later generations do 
move away from the White racial category, they do so 
in favor of collective national ethnic labels like 
“Latino” or “Hispanic.” 75  Furthermore, the Latino 
imagination consistently identifies a White face as 
the quintessential Latino.76  Even for those Latinos 
                                                       
Directives for the Conduct of Federal Statistical 
Activities, Directive 15, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260, 19,269 
(May 4, 1978).  This permitted Latinos to self-
identify both as of Hispanic origin and as belonging 
to a racial category (Black, White, Asian, Indian, or 
Other).  With the 1980 census Latino respondents 
could self-select their racial and ethnic designation 
rather than have one designated by a census 
enumerator.  Prior to the 1980 census, enumerators 
were instructed to observe and then classify 
Hispanics who “were definitely not Negro” as White.  
See Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the U.S. 
Census: 1890 - 1990, 16 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 75, 78 
(1993).  Mexicans were exempted from this White 
versus Negro visual inspection when “Mexican” was 
briefly included as its own racial category on the 
1930 census.  Id.  From 1940 to 1970, Mexicans were 
officially included in the White category.  Id.; see 
also CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, 
AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
74
 Darity & Boza, supra note 72, at 13.   
75
 Id. 
76
 Denise DiFulco, Can You Tell a Mexican from a 
Puerto Rican?,  LATINA, Aug. 2003, at 86, 86. 
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who do acknowledge their African ancestry, there is a 
cultural pressure to emphasize their Latino ethnicity 
publicly as a mechanism for distancing themselves 
from public association with the denigrated societal 
class of African Americans.77  This truism is 
highlighted by the popular refrain “the darker the 
skin, the louder the Spanish.”78   
 While commentators in the United States are 
seemingly oblivious to the pre-existing anti-Black 
racism of Latinos, journalists from abroad have 
observed a number of disturbing examples.  For 
instance, a 2001 British Broadcasting Company news 
item entitled “Hate in Action” noted that Latino 
gangs in Los Angeles have a clear mission of anti-
Black ethnic cleansing in their neighborhoods and 
that Latinos are increasingly perpetrators of anti-
Black hate crimes in the United States.79  In fact, 
four Latino gang members were recently convicted in 
Los Angeles for engaging in a six-year conspiracy to 
assault and murder African Americans in the city’s 
Highland Park neighborhood.80  During the trial, 
                     
77
 PATRICIA R. PESSAR, A VISA FOR A DREAM: DOMINICANS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 44 (1995).   
78
 DAVID HOWARD, COLORING THE NATION: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 114 - 15 (2001).  
79
 Pilar Marrero, El Odio en Acción, BBCMUNDO.COM, Aug. 
29, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/newsid_1513
000/1513820.stm. 
80
 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gang Members 
Convicted of Federal Hate Crimes for Murders and 
Assaults of African-Americans (Aug. 1, 2006), 
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federal prosecutors demonstrated that African 
American residents were terrorized in an effort to 
force them out of a neighborhood perceived as 
Latino.81  Notably, the victims of the violence were 
not themselves members of gangs.  One African 
American resident was murdered as he looked for a 
parking space.82  As a consequence of the incendiary 
facts, the trial garnered some media attention and is 
thus an exception to the general public silence about 
Latino expressions of anti-Black bias in the United 
States.83 
The one area in which Latino anti-Black racism 
has begun to be discussed in the United States is 
                                                       
available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_crt_481.ht
ml. 
81
 See John Spano, Blacks Were Targeted, Witness 
Insists:  A Highland Park Gang Member Testifies in a 
Civil Rights Conspiracy Trial That a 1999 Murder Was 
Part of a Racial Cleansing Campaign, L.A. TIMES, July 
6, 2006, at B4. 
82
 See Andrew Murr, A Gang War with a Twist:  
Gangbangers in L.A. on Trial for Deadly Hate Crimes, 
NEWSWEEK, July 17, 2006, at 29. 
83
 See Tanya K. Hernández, Op-Ed., Roots of 
Latino/Black Anger: Longtime Prejudices, Not Economic 
Rivalry, Fuel Tensions, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at M1 
(discussing the growing pattern of Latino gangs  
targeting peaceful, non-gang-affiliated Black 
residents in Los Angeles, culminating in the murder 
of fourteen-year-old Cheryl Green on December 15, 
2006).  
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with respect to the apparent racial caste system of 
Spanish-language television that presents Latinos as 
almost exclusively White.84  In fact, because of the 
scarce but derogatory images of Afro-Latinos in the 
media, activists have been lobbying the Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund to consider a 
lawsuit against the two major Spanish-language 
networks to challenge their depiction of Afro-
Latinos.85  Some Latino activists see a direct 
parallel between the whiteness of Spanish-language 
television and Latino politics.  One such activist 
states: 
Latino leaders and organizations do not 
want to acknowledge that racism exists 
among our people, so they have ignored the 
issue by subscribing to a national origin 
strategy.  This strategy identifies Latinos 
as a group comprising different 
nationalities, thereby creating the false 
impression that Latinos live in a color-
blind society.86 
Many concrete examples demonstrate that Latinos 
are not colorblind.  To begin with, Afro-Latinos in 
the United States experience color discrimination at 
the hands of other Latinos.  In fact, the 2002 
National Survey of Latinos indicated that Latinos 
with more pronounced African ancestry, such as 
Dominicans, more readily cite color discrimination as 
                     
84
 Michael A. Fletcher, The Blond, Blue-Eyed Face of 
Spanish TV, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2000, at A01. 
85
 Carlos Flores, Race Discrimination Within the 
Latino Community, DIÁLOGO, Winter/Spring 2001, at 30 – 
31, available at 
http://condor.depaul.edu/~dialogo/back_issues/issue_5
/race_discrimination.htm. 
86
 Id. 
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an explanation for the bias they experience from 
other Latinos.87  Furthermore, despite variations 
across regions and ethnic groups, the commonality of 
social distance in relations with African Americans 
remains constant.  What follows is a preliminary 
review of the social science literature that 
demonstrates the consistency of anti-Black sentiment 
in Latino communities across the United States. 
C. Racial Attitudes Among Latinos Across Ethnic 
Groups and Regions 
Of all the Latino ethnic subgroups, Mexican 
Americans have the largest demographic presence 
within the United States.88  The development of 
                     
87
 PEW HISPANIC CTR. & THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF LATINOS 74 (2002), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.pdf. 
88
 The 2000 census reported that of the 35.3 million 
Latinos in the United States, 58% were of Mexican or 
Mexican American origin.  See Press Release, U.S. 
Census Bureau, Census 2000 Paints Statistical 
Portrait of the Nation's Hispanic Population (May 10, 
2001), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/2001/cb01-81.html.  This large 
demographic presence represents not only contemporary 
immigration flows from Mexico, but also the 
generations of Mexican Americans who trace their 
roots to the incorporation of Mexican lands into the 
United States after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican American War.  See 
RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A 
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Mexican American racial identity in the United States 
has been subject to a variety of influences.  Prior 
to the Chicano movement, Mexican American leaders 
claimed that Mexicans were Caucasian and therefore 
deserving of the same social status as White-Anglos.89  
“The Mexican American generation saw themselves as a 
White group,” writes Professor Ian Haney Lopez.  
“This self-conception both drew upon and led to 
prejudice against African Americans, which in turn 
hindered direct relations between those two groups.”90  
Only after widespread police brutality and judicial 
                                                       
LEGACY OF CONFLICT (1990); THE MEXICAN WAR: A CRISIS FOR 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Archie P. McDonald ed., 1969).  
89
 Ruben Salazar, the Los Angeles Times journalist who 
most faithfully reported the developments of the 
Chicano movement, observed that “many [Mexican 
Americans] still cling to the idea that Mexican 
Americans are Caucasians, thus white, thus ‘one of 
the boys.’”  Ruben Salazar, Chicanos Would Find 
Identity Before Coalition With Blacks, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 1979, reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED 
WRITINGS, 1955 - 1970, at 239, 241 (Mario T. Garcia ed., 
1995).  In addition, Salazar observed that “several 
of the more conservative Mexican-American leaders 
strongly oppose any ‘mixing’ of Mexican-American and 
Negro grievances.”  Ruben Salazar, Negro Drive 
Worries Mexican-Americans, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1963, 
reprinted in BORDER CORRESPONDENT: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1955 - 
1970, at 113, 113  (Mario T. Garcia ed., 1995). 
90
 Ian Haney Lopez, Protest, Repression, and Race: 
Legal Violence and the Chicano Movement, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 205, 216 (2001). 
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mistreatment of Mexicans in the wake of the Black 
civil rights movement did a Chicano movement that 
stressed a non-White Chicano identity emerge.91  Yet 
this non-White identity focused upon Chicanos’ 
indigenous ancestry and completely submerged their 
African ancestry.92   
 Even with their construction of a non-White 
racial identification, Chicanos in California and the 
Southwest in the 1960s and 1970s expressed feelings 
of cultural superiority with respect to African 
Americans that adversely affected inter-group 
interactions.93  At the time, one Chicano college 
student summed up this sentiment when he wrote: 
We’re not like the Negroes.  They want to 
be white men because they have no history 
to be proud of.  My ancestors come from one 
of the most civilized nations in the 
world.94  
Such sentiments in turn fed Chicano resentment about 
the allocation of government funds in Los Angeles 
after the 1965 Watts urban uprising, and the 
allocation of government funds to service agencies 
catering to what were described to be as “less needy” 
African Americans.95  Such perspectives have not 
                     
91
 Id. 
92
 Tanya Katerí Hernández, Afro-Mexicans and the 
Chicano Movement: The Unknown Story, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1537 (2004) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: 
THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003)). 
93
 FRED BARBARO, Ethnic Resentment, in BLACK/BROWN/WHITE 
RELATIONS: RACE RELATIONS IN THE 1970S 77, 89 - 91 (Charles 
V. Willie ed., 1977). 
94
 Id. at 91. 
95
 Id. at 90. 
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greatly changed in the new millennium.  In Los 
Angeles, where a predominant number of Latinos are 
Chicano, it has been observed: 
Many Latinos fail to understand the 
complexity and severity of the black 
experience.  They frequently bash blacks 
for their poverty and goad them to pull 
themselves up like other immigrants have 
done.  Worse, some even repeat the same 
vicious anti-black epithets used by racist 
whites.96 
For instance, in the 2000 New York Times series 
entitled “How Race is Lived in America,” an 
investigation into the North Carolina pork industry 
revealed a rigidly planned hierarchy in job tasks 
assigned by race that usually had White-Anglos 
employed as supervisors over both African Americans 
and Latinos.97  Yet rather than focusing on the 
injustice of all-White management ranks, Mexican 
worker Mrs. Fernandez is quoted as saying, “Blacks 
don’t want to work.  They’re lazy.”98   Her husband is 
quoted as saying, “I hate the Blacks.”99  Even Mexican 
Americans with greater exposure to the U.S. history 
of racism express cultural superiority over African 
Americans.  One prominent Mexican American business 
executive and commentator in Los Angeles, Fernando 
Oaxaca, accounts for the difference in Latino and 
African American economic conditions with the 
                     
96
 Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Urban Tension: Latinos’ New 
Clout Threatening to Blacks, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 
2003, at V3. 
97
 Charlie LeDuff, At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things 
Never Die: Who Kills, Who Cuts, Who Bosses Can Depend 
on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at A1. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. 
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explanation, “[W]e have a work ethic.”100 
Even younger generations are not immune to anti-
Black sentiment.  In recent years the Los Angeles 
town of Inglewood has experienced violence almost 
every time Black History Month is celebrated.101  The 
source of the violence is Latino teens’ resentment at 
the month-long celebration of Black culture.  In 
February 1999, the principal of Inglewood High School 
cancelled the Black History Month celebration in 
order to avoid the violence.102 
Los Angeles Latinos have even proposed having 
block association meetings that exclude the African 
American residents of the block, prompting one 
African American resident to state, “[I]t seems like 
the Latinos don’t even want to try to forge 
neighborhood unity.” 103  This social distance is 
paralleled even in church congregations in which 
Latino and African American parishioners who share 
the same church attend separate services, serve on 
separate parish councils, and never meet.104  It is 
interesting to note that even when African American 
congregations in other areas of the United States 
have actively made it part of their ministry to reach 
                     
100
 Gary Lee & Robert Suro, Latino-Black Rivalry 
Grows: Los Angeles Reflects Tensions Between 
Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at A01. 
101
 Martin Kasindorf & Maria Puente, Hispanics and 
Blacks Find Their Futures Entangled, USA TODAY, Sept. 
10, 1999, at 21A. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Lee & Suro, supra note 100, at A01. 
104
 Lee & Suro, supra note 100, at A01. 
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out to their Latino neighbors, the social distance of 
Latinos remains.105  Ethnographic studies of Mexican 
Americans in Chicago and the southern states uncover 
the same disdain for African Americans and 
attributions of blackness in Latino subgroups.106  For 
example, one Latino student at a Chicago high school 
said: “It’s crazy.  But a lot of the Hispanic kids 
here just don’t want to be friends with the 
blacks.”107 
The general racial relations of Cubans with 
African Americans in Florida are not much better.  In 
fact, Miami, Florida (a city in which Cubans and 
other Latinos predominate and hold political power), 
has the distinction of being the only city that was 
                     
105
 Francis W. Guidry, Reaching The People Across the 
Street:  An African American Church Reaches Out To 
Its Hispanic Neighbors (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Drew University Theological School) (on 
file with author). 
106
 See NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, LATINO 
CROSSINGS: MEXICANS, PUERTO RICANS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 187 - 89 (2003) (discussing ethnographic 
study of Latino racial attitudes in Chicago); McClain 
et al., supra note 47 (discussing study of Latino 
immigrant views of Blacks in the U.S. South);  see 
also Rachel L. Swarns, Bridging a Racial Rift That 
Isn’t Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at A1 
(describing derogatory racial attitudes of Mexican 
workers in the U.S. South toward African Americans). 
107
 Jacquelyn Heard, Racial Strife Runs Deep at High 
School: Black and Hispanic Staff, Students Clash at 
Farragut, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1992, at 1C. 
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the locus of four separate race riots in the 1980s.108  
The immediate causes of all four riots were police 
shootings of African Americans.109  Although police 
brutality against African Americans is endemic 
throughout the United States, Miami is a city with 
many Latino police officers and, more alarmingly, a 
Latino population seemingly indifferent to anti-Black 
police brutality.  For instance, when a Colombian 
immigrant police officer was found guilty of 
manslaughter for killing an African American 
motorcyclist, the Latino community came out in 
protest.110  Furthermore, Latinos publicly denounced 
the urban uprisings that marked each affront to the 
humanity of African Americans as the work of the 
“criminal element.” 111  Indeed, sociologists in Miami 
have noted that the Latino discourse about African 
Americans evinces the association of African 
Americans with crime and “an invidious comparison 
between Hispanic economic advancement--attributed to 
hard work, family values, and self-reliance--and 
black dependency on welfare and other social 
                     
108
 Marvin Dunn & Alex Stepick III, Blacks in Miami, 
in MIAMI NOW! IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 41 
(Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex Stepick III eds., 1992). 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. at 45. 
111
 John F. Stack & Christopher L. Warren, The Reform 
Tradition and Ethnic Politics: Metropolitan Miami 
Confronts the 1990s, in MIAMI NOW! IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 174 (Guillermo J. Grenier & Alex 
Stepick III eds., 1992).  
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programs.”112  
 In contrast, studies of Puerto Rican relations 
with African Americans in the northeastern United 
States have traditionally noted the smaller degree of 
social distance that exists between the groups.113  
However, even the Puerto Rican subgroup expresses 
anti-Black racism.  Angela Jorge noted early on that 
Latinos such as Puerto Ricans are taught within their 
family circles to dislike African Americans.114  One 
observer of the civil rights coalitions of Puerto 
Ricans and African Americans even stated that the 
coalition “was more of a strategic device than a 
factual description of the true nature of the 
relationship between the groups.  Puerto Rican 
participation in civil rights organizations and on 
picket lines was lower than for whites.”115  Another 
commentator noted that Puerto Ricans, because of the 
anti-Black prejudice they harbored, were not eager to 
                     
112
 Guillermo J. Grenier & Max Castro, Blacks and 
Cubans in Miami: The Negative Consequences of the 
Cuban Enclave on Ethnic Relations, in GOVERNING AMERICAN 
CITIES: INTERETHNIC COALITIONS, COMPETITION, AND CONFLICT, 137, 
151 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001).   
113
 See Nelson Peery, Witnessing History: An 
Octogenarian Reflects on Fifty Years of African 
American-Latino Relations, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, 
supra note 4, at 305, 306 - 08. 
114
 Angela Jorge, The Black Puerto Rican Woman in 
Contemporary American Society, in THE PUERTO RICAN WOMAN 
134, 139 (Edna Acosta-Belén ed., 1979).   
115
 BARBARO, supra note 93, at 83. 
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be identified with African Americans.116  In fact, the 
residential segregation between the two groups is 
high.117  Even though Puerto Rican youth organizations 
in the 1960s and 1970s modeled themselves after the 
Black Panthers, the groups never had much contact 
with Black Power organizations.118   
 In fact, although relations between Puerto 
Ricans and African Americans in New York City are 
typically depicted as unusually harmonious, electoral 
politics studies have shown the two groups at odds 
with one another.119  Similarly, in Chicago, racial 
tensions between Puerto Ricans and African Americans 
have arisen over the competition for housing 
rehabilitation, in which Puerto Ricans have depicted 
African Americans as presumed gang members, 
criminals, and generally the cause of the tightening 
                     
116
 José E. Cruz, Interminority Relations in Urban 
Settings:  Lessons from the Black-Puerto Rican 
Experience, in BLACK AND MULTIRACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 84, 
90 (Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh & Lawrence J. Hanks eds., 
2000). 
117
 Id. at 91. 
118
 Id. at 92; see also MIGUEL “MICKEY” MELENDEZ, WE TOOK THE 
STREETS:  FIGHTING FOR LATINO RIGHTS WITH THE YOUNG LORDS 
(2003). 
119
 Angelo Falcón, Black and Latino Politics in New 
York City: Race and Ethnicity in a Changing Urban 
Context, in LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 171 (F. Chris 
Garcia ed., 1988); Silvio Torres-Saillant, Racism in 
the Americas and the Latino Scholar, in NEITHER ENEMIES 
NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 281, 299. 
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housing market.120  
 The concern with a racialized competition 
between Latinos and African Americans does not 
dissipate when one examines Dominicans, who are 
frequently viewed as Black themselves.121  Despite 
often sharing the more visible facial imprint of 
African ancestry, Dominicans and African Americans 
have a high level of residential segregation,122 and 
Dominicans resent job competition from African 
Americans.123  Recent reports of high-school violence 
show Dominican youth and African American youth 
involved in violent clashes as well.124  Yet despite 
                     
120
 See ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, NATIONAL PERFORMANCES: THE POLITICS 
OF CLASS, RACE, AND SPACE IN PUERTO RICAN CHICAGO 228 - 30 
(2003). 
121
 Jose Itzigsohn et al., Immigrant Incorporation and 
Racial Identity: Racial Self-Identification Among 
Dominican Immigrants, 28 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 50, 69 
(2005) (describing high levels of Black external 
racialization of Dominicans in New York and their 
high level of Black self-identification). 
122
 Lance Freeman, A Note on the Influence of African 
Heritage on Segregation: The Case of Dominicans, 35 
URB. AFF. 137, 141 (1999). 
123
 Jose Itzigsohn & Carlos Dore-Cabral, Competing 
Identities?  Race, Ethnicity and Panethnicity Among 
Dominicans in the United States, 15 SOC. F. 225, 240 
(2000). 
124
 See Russell, supra note 15 (reporting the 
harassment of African American athletes by a 
Dominican gang of students known as the “D Block” in 
Perth Amboy, New Jersey). 
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the troublesome incidents demonstrating discord 
between Latinos and African Americans and the 
complexity of Latino racial attitudes, the emerging 
Latino inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases 
often treat Latinos as incapable of racial or ethnic 
discrimination. 
II. THE EMERGING LATINO INTER-ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION CASES 
The majority of the emerging cases of Latino 
inter-ethnic discrimination are disparate treatment 
claims filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.125  This accords with the majority 
                     
125
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000).  A list of the 
relevant cases presently available in LexisNexis and 
Westlaw follows.  Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., 336 
F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (African American plaintiff 
alleging that Hispanic supervisor treated Hispanic 
employees better and gave her more onerous 
responsibilities); Osei-Buckle v. Laidlaw Transit, 
Inc., No. CV-96-00753-DDP, 1998 WL 552126, at *1 (9th 
Cir. Aug. 27, 1998) (African American plaintiff 
alleging Hispanic supervisor discriminated against 
her and expressed preference for Hispanic employees 
in allocating work assignments); Patino v. Rucker, 
No. 96-7531, 1997 WL 416949, at *1 (2d Cir. July 25, 
1997) (Puerto Rican porter for Columbia University 
alleging that he was discharged by his Hispanic 
supervisor and replaced with another Latino porter, 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 
Arrocha v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. CV021868, 2004 WL 
594981, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (Afro-
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Panamanian college instructor alleging illegal 
termination in preference for non-Black Hispanic 
employees); Isaac v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 
No. 00-0890-CIV, 2002 WL 31086118, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 3, 2002) (African American plaintiff alleging 
discrimination by Hispanic supervisor); Allen v. 
Bake-Line Prods., Inc., No. 98 C 1119, 2001 WL 
1249054, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2001) (analyzing 
allegation by fifteen African American plaintiffs 
that Hispanic management preferred Hispanic employees 
and failed to promote African American employees to 
position of supervisor as an individual disparate 
treatment case because the statistical data presented 
by plaintiff was insufficient to mount a systemic 
case); Rai v. Dynagear, Inc., No.98 C 6053, 2000 WL 
875401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2000) (Southeast 
Asian Indian plaintiff alleging discriminatory 
termination by Hispanic supervisor and other Hispanic 
managers who preferred to work with Mexicans and not 
Indians); Olumuyiwa v. Harvard Prot. Corp., No. 98-
CV-5110, 1999 WL 529553, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 
1999) (Nigerian plaintiff alleging that Hispanic and 
Yugoslavian employees were hired at a higher wage and 
received greater number of work hours than Black 
employees); Rodriguez v. Torres, 60 F. Supp. 2d 334 
(D.N.J. 1999) (Hispanic plaintiff alleging that 
Hispanic supervisor denied him a promotion and 
subjected him to a hostile work environment because 
of his involvement in Hispanic community activism); 
Russell v. Am. Eagle Airlines, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1330 
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (African American aircraft mechanic 
alleging that employees and supervisors who were 
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either White or Hispanic racially harassed him); 
Thompson v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 
No. 97 C 1172, 1999 WL 258488, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
13, 1999) (African American plaintiff alleging 
discriminatory termination and replacement by 
Hispanic candidate along with preferential treatment 
for Hispanic employees); Harper v. Hunter Coll., No. 
95 CIV. 10388, 1999 WL 147698, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
15, 1999) (West Indian assistant principal custodial 
supervisor alleging that his Hispanic immediate 
supervisor and Black American director of 
housekeeping subjected him to harassment, 
retaliation, and termination); Sprott v. Franco, No. 
94 Civ. 3818, 1998 WL 472061, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 
1998) (African American who worked as Deputy Director 
of New York City Housing Authority Office of Equal 
Opportunity alleged that her Hispanic supervisor 
harassed her and denied her salary increases because 
of her race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); 
Vincent v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. of Fla., 3 
F. Supp. 2d 1405 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (Black, Haitian-
born security guard alleged that Black and Haitian 
guards were assigned undesirable posts while Whites 
and Hispanics were given desirable posts with rest 
rooms); Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382 
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (African American title clerk 
alleging discrimination in a predominantly Caucasian-
Hispanic car dealership); Bernard v. N.Y. City Health 
& Hosps. Corp., No. 93 CIV.8593, 1996 WL 457284 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996) (pro se application by a 
self-described dark-skinned Black woman born in 
Trinidad, West Indies alleging that she had been 
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terminated from her position as Administrative 
Assistant because of her race, color, and national 
origin, all in violation of Title VII, because of 
negative interactions with her Puerto Rican manager 
and other Latina co-workers); Mathura v. Council for 
Human Servs. Home Care Servs., Inc., No. 95CIV.4191, 
1996 WL 157496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1996) (Black 
Belizean plaintiff alleging that Hispanic supervisor 
harassed and verbally abused him and treated him 
differently from the Hispanic employees); Roberts v. 
CBS Broadcasting Inc., No. BC 227280, 2003 WL 
1194102, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2003) (African 
American camera technician alleging Hispanic 
supervisor relegated him to temporary job positions 
and routinely passed him over in favor of non-African 
Americans with less seniority, experience or 
expertise who were often preselected when openings 
were not posted). 
 The number of emerging cases has thus far been 
modest, in large measure because of the racially 
segmented nature of the employment market, which 
relegates different racial and ethnic groups to 
different employment sectors and job positions.  See 
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, 
WORK, AND THE LAW 182 - 83, 254 (Univ. Wis. Press 1985) 
(1977) (providing statistical data regarding the 
racial segmentation of the labor market); DEIRDRE A. 
ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND:  HOW WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE 
BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS 29 - 33 (2003) (explaining 
the dynamic of labor market racial segmentation and 
how the operation of ethnic networks facilitates 
racial hierarchy); Elizabeth Higginbotham, Employment 
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of employment discrimination claims that are filed by 
individual plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment 
rather than class claims of systemic disparate 
treatment or disparate impact.126  Accordingly, this 
                                                       
for Professional Black Women in the Twentieth 
Century, in INGREDIENTS FOR WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT POLICY 73 - 91 
(Christine Bose & Glenna Spitze eds., 1987) 
(detailing how even when Blacks enter into 
traditionally segregated professions, they are 
relegated to racially segregated positions).  It is 
the longstanding existence of racial segmentation 
that in turn can fuel racial hostilities when 
different racial and ethnic groups interact in the 
workplace.  See, e.g., Roberto Lovato, The 
Latinization of New Orleans, NEW AM. MEDIA, Oct. 18, 
2005, 
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.htm
l?article_id=fa92e2c88a63985418da75582292b5c7 
(describing the influx of Latino workers as a 
“radical Latinization that is transforming [New 
Orleans and] other urban landscapes in the country” 
and that has “strained race relations by lowering 
wages and fostering competition between groups”). 
126
 See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 83 (2001) (describing the different 
stages of proof in a class-based systemic disparate 
treatment case alleging that an employer’s hiring or 
promotion practice results in the hiring or promotion 
of fewer members of a protected group in relation to 
the number of qualified group members in the local 
labor pool); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: 
VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 70 - 87 (2001) 
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Article’s examination of Latino inter-ethnic 
employment discrimination focuses on individual 
disparate treatment claims. 
A. Doctrinal Contours of Disparate Treatment 
 In an individual disparate treatment case, an 
employer may not, with a rule, policy, or decision, 
treat an employee differently than she treats other 
employees on account of race or ethnicity.127  The 
plaintiff must prove that the employer purposefully 
treated her differently compared to similarly 
situated individuals from other racial or ethnic 
groups.  Yet absent direct evidence of discriminatory 
motive128 (for example, outright statements of animus 
                                                       
(describing the doctrinal features of an adverse 
impact case in which a business policy or practice 
affects a plaintiff’s protected group as a class 
differently than it affects members of other groups); 
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing 
Nature of Employment Discrimination, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
983, 1019 - 21 (1991) (detailing the numerical 
patterns in kinds of cases filed). 
127
 See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 126, at 30 - 54 
(describing the features of an individual disparate 
treatment case, which can also be based upon color, 
national origin, gender, or religion). 
128
 In a situation where the employer is alleged to 
have both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory 
motives for the employment decision, known as a 
mixed-motive case, a plaintiff who can establish that 
discrimination played a “motivating factor” in the 
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closely timed with an adverse employment decision), a 
plaintiff can rely upon circumstantial evidence.  
This is done with an elaborate burden-shifting 
process.129 
                                                       
employer’s decision is entitled to judgment.  
Thereafter the defendant is allowed to prove that she 
would have made the same decision absent the 
discriminatory motive, and if the defendant is 
successful the plaintiff is not entitled to any 
compensatory relief on her claim; she can still 
collect attorney’s fees for prevailing on the merits, 
and can possibly obtain injunctive relief.  See 
Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).   
129
 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973).  A plaintiff can establish a prima 
facie inference of discrimination by showing that she 
is a member of a protected group (race, sex, etc.) 
and was rejected after applying for a job or 
promotion for which he or she was qualified, and that 
after rejecting the plaintiff the employer continued 
to seek applications from persons of plaintiff’s 
qualifications.  The employer can rebut the prima 
facie showing of discrimination by proffering a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.  
Thereafter the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
present either further evidence of discriminatory 
intent or evidence that the defendant’s proffered 
nondiscriminatory justification was actually a 
pretext for discrimination.  The elements of the 
prima facie case may be modified to suit varying 
factual patterns beyond the hiring and promotion 
context.  But it is not sufficient for a plaintiff 
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merely to show that the employer’s proffer of a 
nondiscriminatory reason was “unbelievable.” See 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000); 
see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 
(1993).  Scholars have observed that over time, 
courts have transformed the burden-shifting process 
into one that is more burdensome on plaintiffs than 
originally intended by McDonnell Douglas.  See, e.g., 
Symposium, Employment Discrimination and the Problems 
of Proof, 61 LA. L. REV. 487 (2001).  It is also 
unclear whether the Supreme Court decision in Desert 
Palace has altered the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
standard.  See MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORKLAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 560 (2005) (“Although, on its face, the 
Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Desert Palace 
was uncontroversial, it has sparked a lively debate 
in the lower courts (so far principally confined to 
district courts) regarding whether the case has 
altered the McDonnell Douglas proof structure.”); see 
also id. at 560 (“Traditionally, the mixed-motives 
structure was seen as an alternative proof structure. 
. . . But now that the Supreme Court has held that 
circumstantial evidence can be used to prove a mixed-
motive case, there is a question whether the two 
structures have effectively been merged, given that 
circumstantial evidence is the means to prove 
pretext.”); Sheila A. Skojec, Effect of Mixed or Dual 
Motives in Actions Under Title VII, 83 A.L.R. FED. 268 
(listing cases that apply Desert Palace differently).  
But see Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per 
curiam) (chastising the Eleventh Circuit for its 
inappropriate test once pretext is shown and thereby 
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In the absence of evidence of overt 
discriminatory treatment, the plaintiff may offer 
statistical data about the composition of the 
workforce in comparison to the number of racial 
minorities in the relevant labor market to allow the 
court to infer discrimination.130  Ironically, this 
ability to infer discrimination from racial disparity 
in the workplace can lead fact-finders in inter-
ethnic discrimination cases to conclude that diverse 
workplaces are free of discrimination.  The juridical 
belief in the inherent salutary powers of a diverse 
workplace exists despite established Supreme Court 
precedent to the contrary.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court has rejected the notion that a workplace with a 
large number of employees from a plaintiff’s 
protected group is de facto free of bias against the 
plaintiff.131  However, the emerging inter-ethnic 
                                                       
suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 
test remains separate from the Price Waterhouse 
mixed-motive test). 
130
 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 - 05 
(noting that statistical evidence showing an 
employer’s general policy or practice is relevant to 
whether an individual employment decision was 
discriminatory). 
131
 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 
542 (1971) (per curiam) (vacating summary judgment in 
a sex discrimination case in which the district court 
erroneously concluded that an over-representation of 
women in the workplace obviated the existence of bias 
against women by an employer that refused to accept 
job applications from women with preschool-age 
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discrimination cases suggest that judges are 
doctrinal amnesiacs when caught up in the 
romanticization of diversity. 
B. The Diversity Defense and Its Obfuscation 
 The diversity defense describes the way in which 
legal actors immediately view a racially “diverse” 
workplace as the equivalent of a racially harmonious 
workplace.132  These legal actors view people of color 
                                                       
children). 
132
 It should be noted that more than a decade ago 
Juan Perea presciently suggested that employers would 
be able to defend themselves against a claim of 
national-origin discrimination by the presentation of 
workplace statistics indicating a large percentage of 
racial minorities.  See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and 
Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
805, 864 - 65 (1994) (describing the potential for an 
employer’s “minority percentage points defense” to 
national origin discrimination claims).  Yet the two 
cases available to Perea at that time did not 
explicitly deploy racial minority percentages data as 
the justification for denying relief to the 
plaintiffs, as is done in the Latino inter-ethnic 
discrimination cases discussed herein.  See Espinoza 
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973) (finding no 
evidence of national-origin discrimination when there 
was no disparity in Latino hiring and the only direct 
evidence was employer’s neutrally applied policy 
against hiring undocumented workers); Garcia v. 
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as the same, overlooking the particular histories and 
present incidence of racial animus within and across 
different ethnic groups.133  The judicial fashioning 
                                                       
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding 
that in the absence of both direct evidence of 
national origin discrimination and an indirect 
suggestion of discrimination from a workplace 
statistical imbalance in the hiring of Latinos, the 
neutral application of a workplace English-only rule 
was not national-origin discrimination). 
133
 The colorblind approach of the diversity defense 
is not exclusive to judges of any particular race.  
Cf. Martin Kilson, Anatomy of Black Conservatism, 59 
TRANSITION 4, 7 (1993) (describing the articulation of 
colorblind discourse amongst Black intellectuals).  
The one exception to the judicial use of the 
diversity defense that appears in the emerging inter-
ethnic discrimination cases is in the context of 
White plaintiffs filing reverse-discrimination 
allegations in diverse non-White workplace settings.  
This is the only context where the diverse workplace 
does not mislead judges into automatically presuming 
the existence of a bias-free workplace.  See Bass v. 
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(reversing summary judgment order for defendant where 
White plaintiff alleged discrimination in layoff 
decision from racially diverse workplace); EEOC v. 
David Gomez & Assocs., Inc., 1997 WL 136285 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 17, 1997) (denying summary judgment where 
White plaintiff alleged discrimination because he was 
not referred for employment by agency that chose to 
refer Latino and African American candidates 
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of a diversity defense to claims of employment 
discrimination appears to reflect the public 
romanticization of diversity as a panacea for racial 
conflict.134  Diversity as a concept was first 
introduced into the legal discourse as a 
justification for race-conscious remedies to racial 
inequality, such as affirmative action.135  Since that 
time, it has taken on a force of its own in the 
public imagination136 through the operation of what 
                                                       
instead). 
134
 See Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” 
Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-
Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 102 (1998) 
(observing the growing societal belief that racial 
diversity will deconstruct and transcend race and 
racism);  see also Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content 
of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 106 
(1999) (discussing the growing scholarship that 
equates increasing racial diversity with the 
reconstruction of racism and the Black-White paradigm 
of race).     
135
 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);  see 
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(holding the use of racial preferences to enroll a 
critical mass of underrepresented students of color 
legally permissible to serve the compelling interests 
of achieving a diverse and robust exchange of ideas 
and developing leaders from various racial 
communities).    
136
 See Lana Bortolot, Group Dynamics: Companies 
Embrace Diversity, Teach Employees Respect, AM NEW 
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sociologist Lauren Edelman aptly terms “diversity 
rhetoric.”137  Research corroborates the public 
                                                       
YORK, Mar. 6, 2006, at 33, available at 
http://www.amNY.com/careers (“Remember when ‘synergy’ 
was the buzzword a few years ago? Well, get ready for 
a new one.  Diversity is what’s hot now.”); Myron 
Curry, Diversity:  No Longer Just Black and White, 
BLACK EOE J., Spring 2005, at 46, 46 (“Most CEO’s and 
executives alike have come to discover that diversity 
is what often makes for better business.”); Chris 
Woodyard, Multilingual Staff Can Drive up Auto Sales; 
Ethnic Communities Show Buying Power, USA TODAY, Feb. 
22, 2005, at B1 (reporting that businesses all over 
the country are realizing that being multicultural 
has profit benefits);  see also Peter H. Schuck, The 
Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1915, 1937 - 38 (2001) (“Nor is diversity 
merely a widespread ideal among social and 
educational elites; it is now an explicit public 
policy goal emphatically endorsed by both major 
parties and opposed by none . . . .”).  But see 
Orlando Patterson, On the Provenance of Diversity, 23 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 61 (2005) (“What is true of the 
private sector has been true of society and the 
economy at large.  The focus has shifted from 
addressing the very special problems of African 
Americans to the promotion of a feel-good, but 
largely empty, goal of ethnic diversity.”). 
137
 Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and 
the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 
(2001) (discussing employers’ “diversity rhetoric” 
and expansion of the legal concept of diversity to 
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support for diversity and indicates that diverse 
workplaces help to facilitate creative problem 
solving, attract larger client bases, and effectively 
operate within a global marketplace.138   
However, the mere presence of coworkers from 
various backgrounds in a single workplace does not 
magically foster racial harmony.  Indeed, the 
research regarding diverse work teams indicates that 
employers need to cultivate particular conditions in 
order to generate effective work teams of diverse 
backgrounds.139  Otherwise, racial conflict and poor 
social relations can continue to exist even within 
                                                       
nonlegal dimensions). 
138
 See DIVERSITY IN WORK TEAMS: RESEARCH PARADIGMS FOR A 
CHANGING WORKPLACE (Susan E. Jackson & Marian N. Ruderman 
eds., 1995);  see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: 
HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) 
(discussing the importance of workplace bonds to 
enhancing inter-group relations); Steven A. Ramirez, 
Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85 
(2000) (summarizing literature demonstrating the 
business benefits of a diverse workforce); David B. 
Wilkins, From “Separate is Inherently Unequal” to 
“Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-
Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black 
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1556 (2004). 
139
 See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural 
Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity 
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001) (concluding that diverse work 
teams function better with an “integration-and-
learning” approach than with other approaches). 
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that diverse setting.140  In fact, many of the 
emerging Latino inter-ethnic cases describe what 
appear to be racially hostile environments, even 
though the cases are not litigated as racial 
harassment cases.  Unfortunately, court opinions 
reflect a fanciful notion of diversity that is not 
supported by scientific research or legal doctrine. 
The diversity defense is most explicitly and 
comprehensively articulated in the 2004 case Arrocha 
v. CUNY,141 which serves as the paradigmatic example 
of the analytical problems surfacing in the emerging 
inter-ethnic discrimination cases.  This Article 
focuses upon Arrocha to present the doctrinal 
problems of the diversity defense.  In Arrocha, a 
self-identified Afro-Panamanian tutor of Spanish sued 
City University of New York (CUNY) for failure to 
renew his appointment as an adjunct instructor, 
claiming a violation of Title VII’s prohibition 
against race and national-origin discrimination.  The 
plaintiff alleged that the Latino heads of the Medgar 
                     
140
 See Shari Caudron, Diversity Ignites Effective 
Work Teams, BLACK EOE J., Spring 2005, at 40 (stating 
that resegregation can occur when racial bias is 
ignored as an issue in the workplace).  Legal scholar 
Cynthia Estlund also notes that the potential for 
conflict is heightened in low-wage settings and 
contingent employment sectors where employees’ 
motivation to overcome differences is undermined by 
their tenuous connection to the workplace and 
employer suppression of communication among workers.  
ESTLUND, supra note 138, at 45, 56. 
141
 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004). 
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Evers College Spanish department discriminated 
against “Black Hispanics,” and that there was “a 
disturbing culture of favoritism that favor[ed] the 
appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards and white 
Hispanics from South America.”142  Yet the court 
dismissed his race and national-origin discrimination 
claims because the judge did not understand how a 
color hierarchy informs the ways in which Latinos 
subject other Latinos to racism and national-origin 
bias.143  Indeed, the national-origin claim was 
                     
142
 Id. at *7. 
143
 Ironically, the judge sua sponte converted the 
claim into a color-discrimination claim and allowed 
it to survive the summary judgment motion.  This is 
an unsatisfactory characterization of Latino inter-
ethnic discrimination claims because not all Latino 
plaintiffs who experience discrimination have dark 
skin or prominent African features as markers of 
their social treatment.  For those Latino plaintiffs 
whose African ancestry is not readily discernible, it 
is important to examine a workplace environment for 
the deployment of racial stereotypes tied to national 
origin status that are an aspect of Latino racial 
discourse.  Indeed, judges typically view Latino 
color-discrimination claims as viable when a Latino 
plaintiff alleges color discrimination at the hands 
of a White-Anglo employer or supervisor.  See Tanya 
Katerí Hernández, Latinos at Work: When Color 
Discrimination Means More Than Color, in HIERARCHIES OF 
COLOR: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SKIN COLOR (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 
forthcoming 2007).  Unfortunately for the plaintiff 
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dismissed on summary judgment because five of the 
eight adjunct instructors who were reappointed were 
natives of other South or Central American countries 
such as Argentina, Peru, and Mexico, as well as the 
Dominican Republic.  The judge stated in the opinion, 
“Diversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an 
inference of discriminatory intent.” 144   
This is a completely erroneous assessment of the 
social science doctrine of statistical inference and 
its evidentiary justification as it has been 
incorporated into employment discrimination 
jurisprudence.145  Population statistics have been 
                                                       
in Arrocha, the jury trial on the color-
discrimination issue returned a verdict in favor of 
the defendant.  Telephone Interview with James A. 
Brown, Esq., Attorney for Mr. Arrocha (Feb. 28, 
2006).  Such a result was inevitable once the judge 
handicapped the jury’s assessment of the issues by 
entering summary judgment on the racial and national 
origin discrimination claims and thus presented the 
color claim in isolation from its connections to race 
and national origin discrimination.  
144
 Arrocha, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (emphasis added).   
145
 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 - 97 
(1977) (explaining the precise methods of measuring 
statistical significance of racial disparities).  
While statistical significance suggests that two or 
more variables are correlated, its absence yields no 
definite conclusions about the relationship between 
the variables.  See generally DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES 
W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); JOSEPH 
L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 
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traditionally considered relevant to Title VII cases 
involving gross under-representations of racial 
minorities because our racial history demonstrates 
that in the absence of any other explanation it is 
more likely than not that racial discrimination 
accounts for the gross under-representation.146  Yet 
the initial Supreme Court authorization in McDonnell 
                                                       
(1988); RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILBORN, THE STATISTICS 
OF DISCRIMINATION (1994).  In the absence of statistical 
significance, it is difficult to conclude from a 
comparison between workforce composition numbers and 
those of the relevant labor market that some social 
construct other than pure chance accounts for the 
workforce numbers.  But that absence does not 
foreclose the possibility that factors other than 
pure chance actually did influence the workforce 
composition numbers, and more importantly that the 
individual plaintiff might have received 
discriminatory treatment.  See KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING 
PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII ACTIONS, 14 - 28 (2d ed. supp. 
2005) (“Courts have sometimes erroneously stated that 
a statistical calculation yielding less than a 
finding of a statistically significant level of 
improbability is affirmative evidence of the absence 
of discrimination.  This is completely illogical and 
an abuse of statistics for several reasons.”).   
146
 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 340 n.20 (1977) (“Statistics showing racial or 
ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this 
one only because such imbalance is often a telltale 
sign of purposeful discrimination . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
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Douglas Corp. v. Green to use workforce statistics in 
individual disparate treatment cases was only an 
authorization insofar as such statistics “may be 
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner’s 
refusal to hire respondent in this case conformed to 
a general pattern of discrimination.”147  There was no 
suggestion that workforce statistics could have a 
conclusive exculpatory use in such cases.  Inverting 
the traditional use of population statistics by 
treating a racially diverse workforce as the 
equivalent of a bias-free workplace also contravenes 
an early Supreme Court approach to proving Title VII  
employment discrimination when the plaintiff’s 
protected class is proportionately represented in the 
workplace.148 
                     
147
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
805 (1973). 
148
 The diversity defense’s esteem for the probative 
value of workforce composition statistics in 
discrimination cases stands in marked contrast to 
courts’ usual disinclination to rely upon workforce 
statistics to decide individual disparate treatment 
cases.  See, e.g., Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 
406 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Second, we conclude the generic 
type of employment statistics presented by Bogren are 
not probative of the reason for her termination.”);  
Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 349 
(7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatistics are improper vehicles 
to prove discrimination in disparate treatment (as 
opposed to disparate impact) cases.”); Martin v. 
Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We 
have previously held that such statistical proof 
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What follows is a detailed account of 
established employment discrimination doctrine that 
is completely overlooked in the emerging inter-ethnic 
discrimination cases.  The doctrinal details are 
presented to underscore the extent to which diversity 
rhetoric subverts the judicial application of 
existing relevant doctrine. 
C. The Traditional Role of Workforce Composition Data 
in Employment Discrimination Cases 
In 1971, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,149 
the Supreme Court was presented with a gender 
discrimination case in which summary judgment had 
been granted in favor of an employer that did not 
accept job applications from women with pre-school-
age children despite employing men with pre-school-
age children.  The district court had based its award 
of summary judgment upon the premise that no question 
of bias could exist in a workplace in which 75 to 80% 
of those hired were women from an application pool in 
which 70 to 75% were women.150  In vacating the 
                                                       
alone cannot ordinarily establish a prima facie case 
of disparate treatment under Title VII or § 1981.”); 
Davis v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 330 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(holding that plaintiff’s workforce statistics were 
insufficient to show employer’s articulated reason 
for denying promotion was a pretext for 
discrimination).  
149
 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 
(1971). 
150
 Id. at 543. 
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summary judgment due to a conflict with Title VII’s 
mandate, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, 
unanimously rejected the equation of significant 
numbers of women in the workplace with the simplistic 
conclusion that no bias against women existed.151  In 
other words, the Supreme Court was fully aware that 
gender discrimination can exist even where a large 
number of women are employed in a given workplace.  
This is because Title VII creates an individual right 
not to be unfairly treated because of protected group 
status.  It is immaterial to a proof of 
discrimination against that individual whether other 
members of the protected group have been hired.  It 
is true that an inference of discrimination can be 
based upon a statistically significant 
disproportionate absence of protected group members 
from a workplace because it often reflects unstated 
bias, unless some other factor such as the 
unavailability of qualified group members can be 
shown to exist.152  But Title VII does not impose the 
symmetrical abstraction of insisting that a 
proportionate representation of protected class 
members precludes a finding of discrimination.   
The Marietta analysis was applied to racial 
discrimination in 1978, albeit without citation to 
Marietta itself.  In Furnco Construction Corp. v. 
Waters153 the Supreme Court stated that a “racially 
                     
151
 Id. at 544. 
152
 See Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977). 
153
 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 
(1978). 
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balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from 
liability for specific acts of discrimination."154  
This is because Title VII is designed to address the 
individual’s experience of discrimination.  The Court 
noted in Furnco, “It is clear beyond cavil that the 
obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an 
equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of 
race, without regard to whether members of the 
applicant’s race are already proportionately 
represented in the work force.”155  Nor is Furnco an 
outdated articulation of discrimination 
jurisprudence, given the Court’s reliance upon this 
particular premise in the 2000 case of Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc.156 To be sure, Furnco 
                     
154
 Id. at 579. 
155
 Id.  Contrast the diversity defense use of 
aggregate workforce statistics with the entrenched 
treatment of individual disparate treatment claims as 
unique to the plaintiff so that the aggregate 
treatment of a class action certification is rarely 
possible.  See, e.g., Abron v. Black & Decker, Inc., 
654 F.2d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding that 
plaintiff’s claim was “a solitary one that could not 
support a class certification”);  see also Melissa 
Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious 
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 787 - 88 (2005) 
(describing judicial hostility toward class action 
certification in disparate treatment cases). 
156
 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“[T]he other evidence on which 
the court relied -- that Caldwell and Oswalt were 
also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that 
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does note that a court may consider the racial mix of 
the workforce in making a determination about the 
existence of discriminatory motive because the 
composition of the workforce “is not wholly 
irrelevant on the issue of intent.” 157  However, that 
is far from treating workforce composition data as 
conclusively demonstrating the absence of 
discriminatory intent.  Such an equivalence is 
prohibited by Furnco.158 
Arrocha disregards Furnco and other Supreme 
                                                       
respondent employed many managers over age 50 -- 
although relevant, is certainly not dispositive.” 
(citing Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580)).   
157
 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580. 
158
 Id; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 
453 - 54 (1982) (holding that for disparate impact 
claims it is immaterial that “bottom-line” hiring 
results were racially balanced and concluding that 
this balance does not preclude a Title VII violation 
for application of a facially discriminatory policy 
to an individual plaintiff).  The doctrinal focus on 
discrimination against an individual, as opposed to 
the diversity of the workplace, is also reflected in 
the prohibition against the use of race norming.  
Race norming is any adjustment of test scores to 
diminish the disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities.  Section 106 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 prohibits it.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (2000).  
Although race norming could be used to ensure a 
racially integrated workforce, it is prohibited by 
law because Title VII focuses on discrimination, not 
diversity. 
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Court precedent rejecting the premise that a racially 
balanced workforce conclusively demonstrates the 
absence of discriminatory intent.  The only juridical 
support cited in Arrocha for the premise that 
“diversity . . . undercuts an inference of 
discriminatory intent”159 is a reference to Chambers 
v. TRM Copy Center Corp.160 Chambers is another inter-
ethnic employment discrimination case in which the 
appellate court opinion discussed in passing how a 
court might assess the ethnic makeup of a workforce.   
In Chambers, a “black person of dark skin and 
Jamaican national origin” alleged employment 
discrimination based on race and national origin when 
he received a letter of reprimand from his African 
American supervisor.161  The appellate court 
recognized that an inference of no discrimination 
might be appropriate where the ethnic makeup of the 
workforce was particularly varied162 and there was no 
direct proof of discriminatory animus, as is 
sometimes provided by racially invidious remarks by 
supervisors and coworkers.  Yet the court was also 
careful to note that the diverse workforce 
                     
159
 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981, at *7 (E.D.N.Y 
Feb. 9, 2004). 
160
 Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctr. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 38 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
161
 Id. at 32. 
162
 The twelve-person workforce comprised  “5 
Caucasian, 4 African-American or dark-skinned West 
Indians (including the plaintiff and the Service 
Center Manager), 2 Asians, and 1 Hispanic.”  Id. at 
33. 
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composition would not be dispositive in all contexts.  
“[I]f, for example, the company had sought to 
downsize its operation and chose to do so by firing 
only one or more of its minority employees,” evidence 
of a racially balanced workforce would not be 
salient.163  In fact, the appellate court in Chambers 
ultimately vacated the defendant’s summary judgment 
victory.  The court remanded for trial because the 
plaintiff’s discharge, absent concrete reasons, 
occurred in circumstances that permitted a rational 
factfinder to infer invidious discrimination 
regardless of the workforce’s racial composition.164   
In short, while Chambers inaccurately assesses 
the ability of a racially balanced workforce to 
support an inference of no discriminatory animus, its 
overarching import is the need to examine all factors 
in context before coming to any conclusions.  In 
fact, Chambers has been relied upon by the Southern 
District of New York for the proposition that “a 
diverse workforce in itself does not preclude the 
finding of an inference of discrimination.”165   Yet 
the Eastern District of New York, which decided 
Arrocha, continues to use Chambers as support for the 
premise that diversity undercuts an inference of 
discrimination in a manner that equates diversity 
with the absence of discrimination.166  This 
                     
163
 Id. at 38. 
164
 Id. at 40. 
165
 Thompson v. Am. Eagle Airlines, No. 99 Civ. 4529 
(JGK), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14932, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 4, 2000). 
166
 See Subramanian v. Prudential Sec., No. CV-01-
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equivalence is struck despite its contravention of 
social science, its conflict with Supreme Court 
precedent, and the implicit rejection of the premise 
by an earlier Second Circuit decision.167   
What then might account for the maverick 
judicial use of bald dialectical reasoning and little 
else168 to assert that diversity necessarily indicates 
                                                       
6500(SJF)(RLM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23231, at *7, 
*23 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2003) (asserting that given 
diversity in defendant’s workforce, where an Asian 
plaintiff from India worked with Korean, African 
American, Hispanic, and White-Anglo coworkers, the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof was heightened). 
167
 Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 
1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the 
absence of statistical significance can simply 
reflect the use of a small sample size and cannot be 
equated with the absence of a correlation between 
race and employment decisions). 
168
 While courts do have broad discretion in their 
ability to take judicial notice of legislative facts 
that relate to the interpretation of applicable law, 
this discretion does not authorize courts to ignore 
relevant legal precedents. See the FED. R. EVID. 201(a) 
advisory committee note suggesting that courts should 
be free to initiate independent research for 
legislative facts and take judicial notice of them.  
But because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
supply guidance as to how legislative facts should be 
incorporated into a case (in contrast to the guidance 
set forth in FED. R. EVID. 201(a) for incorporating 
adjudicative facts), with legislative facts a judge 
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the absence of discrimination?  Perhaps the diversity 
defense judges have taken their cue from the dicta in 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks,169 an example of the rhetorical power 
of the diversity defense to dismiss a suggestion of 
discrimination. 
D. The New Push for Doctrinal Symmetry in the 
Treatment of Workforce Composition Data 
In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that once an 
employer produces evidence of a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action, it is 
immaterial whether the trier of fact is persuaded of 
the veracity of the proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason.  The mere production of the nondiscriminatory 
reason is sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
intentional discrimination from the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.  This is because the ultimate burden of 
persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.  
In response to the dissent’s abhorrence of accepting 
at face value the proffer of any specious 
nondiscriminatory reason by an employer, Justice 
Scalia provides the following hypothetical for 
                                                       
has a dangerous freedom to create new law 
inappropriately.  See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a 
Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption 
of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541, 
1598 (1987) (proposing a tradition of care standard 
for regulating judicial use of legislative facts). 
169
 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 
(1993). 
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consideration: 
 
Assume that 40% of a business’ workforce are 
members of a particular minority group, a group 
which comprises only 10% of the relevant labor 
market.  An applicant, who is a member of that 
group, applies for an opening for which he is 
minimally qualified, but is rejected by a hiring 
officer of that same minority group, and the 
search to fill the opening continues. . . . 
Under the dissent’s interpretation of our law 
. . . [t]he disproportionate minority makeup of 
the company’s workforce and the fact that its 
hiring officer was of the same minority group as 
the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because the 
plaintiff’s case can be proved indirectly by 
showing that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence . . . . [I]t 
is a mockery of justice to say that if the jury 
believes the reason they set forth is probably 
not the “true” one, all the utterly compelling 
evidence that discrimination was not the reason 
will then be excluded from the jury’s 
consideration.170 
While the hypothetical is pure dicta, it is most 
interesting to note that both the majority and the 
dissent refer to the hypothetical construction of a 
disproportionate minority makeup of the workforce and 
the presence of a racial minority hiring officer as 
indicating the absence of discrimination.  This is 
evidenced by Scalia’s reference to the hypothetical 
as “utterly compelling evidence that discrimination 
was not the reason,”171 and the dissent’s 
characterization that the hypothetical employer could 
easily prove a “nondiscriminatory reason it almost 
certainly must have had, given the facts assumed.”172 
In short, despite the lack of precedent or 
statistics doctrinal support, both the Court’s 
                     
170
 Id. at 513 – 14 & n.5 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
171
 Id. at 514. 
172
 Id. at 539 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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opinion and the dissent are caught up in their own 
intuitive notion that a diverse workforce is a 
barometer for nondiscrimination and that racial 
minorities cannot harbor racial bias themselves.  The 
majority opinion and the dissent can be characterized 
as based upon intuition to the extent established 
Title VII doctrine has not similarly applied a 
symmetrical approach to proof of discrimination and 
nondiscrimination.  For instance, the use of 
anecdotal evidence is treated differently when 
presented for purposes of proving discrimination than 
when presented to prove nondiscrimination.173  
Anecdotal evidence can be considered strong evidence 
of intentional discrimination.174  In contrast, 
anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimination carries 
little evidentiary weight.175  The justification for 
the asymmetrical approach to anecdotal evidence is 
the same one that supports the use of a prima facie 
inference of discrimination in disparate treatment 
cases -- namely, the understanding that 
discriminatory intent is often concealed -- and 
necessitates the admission of circumstantial evidence 
and the use of inferences to enforce the mandate 
                     
173
 See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, § 3.01 n.2 
(“[C]ourts tend to rely on anecdotal evidence only 
when it cuts in favor of the plaintiff . . . . ”). 
174
 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 342 - 43 n.24 (1977). 
175
 Id.  Anecdotal evidence of nondiscrimination may 
include employer statements that it does not 
discriminate.  PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 145, § 
3.01 n.2. 
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against discrimination.  This is not the case for 
disputing an allegation of discrimination.  It is a 
straightforward matter for an employer to present 
evidence of actual bases for employment decisions.  
There is no need for inferences from statistical data 
or anecdotal evidence, nor would such evidence be 
probative given the very strong possibility that 
discriminatory motive can coexist with such 
statistical data and anecdotal evidence.  In 
contrast, this nation’s history of racial inequality 
has shown that in the absence of a concrete 
explanation, the inference of discrimination is an 
accurate indicator for the actual existence of 
discrimination.176  Scalia’s hypothetical in Hicks 
reveals the extent to which a disregard for the 
contemporary significance of the nation’s history of 
racism can undermine the justifications for the 
asymmetrical use of inference and other evidentiary 
tools.177  Moreover, it demonstrates how the Court is 
                     
176
 See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
577 (1978) (describing the McDonnell Douglas use of 
inference for finding discrimination as a “sensible, 
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of 
common experience as it bears on the critical 
question of discrimination”) (emphasis added).  
177
 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: 
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 
279, 283 (1997) (explaining how the original 
structures for proving discrimination “functioned 
properly only when the courts applying them were 
willing to see discrimination as a viable explanation 
for social and political conditions” connected to a 
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unacquainted with, or perhaps disinterested in, the 
manifestation of discrimination within diverse 
settings and amongst racial minorities themselves, 
and is thus just as subject to the obfuscation of 
diversity rhetoric as lower courts.  In fact, the 
general jurisprudential movement of narrowing the 
applicability of antidiscrimination law provides a 
hospitable setting for the growth of the diversity 
defense.178  Indeed, the narrow vision suggested by 
the Hicks hypothetical is in direct contrast to 
Supreme Court precedent. 
In Castaneda v. Partida,179 the Court stated that 
“it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law 
                                                       
history that “suggested that discrimination was the 
most likely explanation”);  see also Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and 
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 
26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 1031 (1999) (“To base 
Supreme Court precedent on a hypothetical that bears 
little resemblance to reality is strikingly ill 
advised.”); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in 
Employment Discrimination Law:  Slouching Toward a 
Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 
709, 747 (2002) (“Scalia’s hypothetical is telling.  
Apart from having absolutely nothing to do with the 
case he is deciding, Scalia’s hypothetical reveals he 
believes that most discrimination cases do not 
involve discrimination at all.”). 
178
 See AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND 
THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al. 
eds., 2006). 
179
 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 83 
 
 
that human beings of one definable group will not 
discriminate against other members of their group.”180  
Castaneda is also particularly relevant given its 
rejection of the governing majority defense to 
discrimination that resonates with the equally 
specious diversity defense.  The governing majority 
theory asserts that a prima facie case of 
discrimination can be rebutted with the proof that 
racial minorities were the governing majority of 
decision-makers involved.  In Castaneda, the Supreme 
Court rejected out of hand the notion that a prima 
facie case of discriminatory intent based on the 
exclusion of Mexican Americans from the grand jury 
could be rebutted with proof that three of the five 
jury commissioners were Mexican American.181 
 Yet despite the clearly articulated precedents 
of Castaneda182 and Furnco, which disentangle notions 
                     
180
 Id. at 499. 
181
 Id. at 500. 
182
 Over the years, Castaneda has been relied upon as 
viable precedent regarding the inapplicability of a 
governing majority defense to discrimination.  See 
Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1004 (5th Cir. 
1981); Ausler v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 2d 
1024, 1031 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Eccleston v. Sec’y of 
the Navy, 700 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.D.C. 1988).  In 
addition, social scientists have continued to 
document the persistence of intraracial prejudice, 
which refutes the skepticism about its existence 
expressed by Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in 
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 518 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices 
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of diversity from proof of nondiscrimination, the 
Hicks opinion presents a hypothetical that 
recharacterizes diversity as the equivalent of 
nondiscrimination.  As one employment discrimination 
scholar notes about the case, “[t]o base Supreme 
Court precedent on a hypothetical that bears little 
resemblance to reality is strikingly ill advised.”183  
Moreover, by requiring plaintiffs to provide actual 
proof of discriminatory intent even after showing 
that a defendant’s rebuttal was not credible, Hicks 
gives judges vast discretion to create their own 
                                                       
here in Washington decide solely on the basis of 
inferences from statistics that the Mexican-Americans 
who control the levers of power in this remote border 
county are manipulating them to discriminate ‘against 
themselves.’”).  See WILLIAM E. CROSS, JR., SHADES OF 
BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1991) 
(exploring the relationship between racial identity 
attitudes and internalized racism in African 
Americans); Aaron C. Cargile, Attitudes Toward 
Chinese-Accented Speech: An Investigation in Two 
Contexts, 16 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (1997) 
(describing negative attitudes of Asian Americans 
toward Mandarin-Chinese-accented English within a 
college classroom);  Marta I. Cruz-Janzen, Lives on 
the Crossfire:  The Struggle of Multiethnic and 
Multiracial Latinos for Identity in a Dichotomous and 
Racialized World, 9 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 47 (2002) 
(discussing Latinos’ internalization of bias against 
dark-skinned Latinos). 
183
 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 177, at 1031. 
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definitions of what constitutes discrimination,184 
undermining the adjudicatory force of the prima facie 
proof established by McConnell Douglas v. Green.  As 
civil rights scholar John Valery White astutely 
observes: 
Because Hicks and Reeves now require 
plaintiffs to produce evidence of 
discriminatory intent, judges must 
specifically decide what acts constitute 
race acts and which do not.  With neither 
guidance from above, nor coherent 
categories with which to work, judges after 
Hicks are empowered to answer these 
questions according to their own theories 
of life.185 
Indeed, after Hicks, district court judges are 
certainly assessing summary judgment motions through 
the lenses of their own particular understanding of 
                     
184
 White, supra note 177, at 759 (“Through a minor 
adjustment in proof structures, Hicks has unleashed 
district courts to answer these questions on their 
own, through judges’ imposition of their own 
definition of race, discrimination, and appropriate 
workplace behavior.”);  see also Henry L. Chambers, 
Jr., Getting it Right: Uncertainty and Error in the 
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 43 
- 44 (1996) (describing the post-Hicks prima facie 
case assessment as “the fact-finder’s perceived 
prevalence of intentional discrimination in 
society”); Sheila R. Foster, Causation in 
Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1525 (2005) (“Instead, the Court 
has unleashed the factfinder into a world of causal 
inquiry that is subject to the very biases, 
stereotypes, and misconceptions that underlie the 
discrimination of which the plaintiff complains.”). 
185
 White, supra note 177, at 727.  
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discrimination.186  Unfortunately, that understanding 
seems to be increasingly influenced by public 
discourse that presents racial diversity as the 
equivalent of racial harmony.187  The Arrocha case 
discussed in Section II.B above is an example of a 
judge who concocts a diversity defense to 
discrimination based on his own perspectives of what 
constitutes discrimination.188 
E. Diversity and the Presumed Interchangeability of 
Latinos 
The diversity defense in the Arrocha case is 
problematic in its incoherent understanding of 
employment discrimination law’s application of 
statistical analysis and of Supreme Court precedents 
related to the issue.  Furthermore, in dismissing the 
national origin claim because the Afro-Panamanian 
plaintiff’s employer reappointed natives from other 
South and Central American countries instead of him, 
the Arrocha court treats all Latinos as 
interchangeable and incapable of national-origin 
discrimination against other Latinos.189  The mistaken 
                     
186
 Id. at 716 (“In general Hicks was blamed for 
initiating a considerably more suspicious view of 
Title VII claims and unleashing federal judges to 
reject claims on summary judgment when the facts were 
unpersuasive to the judge.”). 
187
 See supra notes 134 - 137 and accompanying text.   
188
 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 
2004). 
189
 The presumed interchangeability of Latinos in 
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treatment of the panethnic identifier of 
Latino/Hispanic as precluding discrimination between 
various Latinos is also present in other Latino 
inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases.190  
                                                       
employment discrimination cases resembles the 
judicial treatment of color-bias claims brought by 
African Americans.  Specifically, courts have 
difficulty identifying the manifestation of 
discrimination within African American communities 
when assessing color-based discrimination claims 
brought by persons of African ancestry.  This is 
because judges presume that all persons of African 
ancestry are viewed as the same regardless of skin 
color or ethnicity.  The presumed sameness of African 
ancestry obscures the analysis of colorism claims.  
See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism:  A Darker Shade of 
Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2000) (discussing 
the influence of the rule of hypo-descent on the 
judicial application of color-discrimination doctrine 
to persons of African ancestry); see also Trina 
Jones, Shades of Brown:  The Law of Skin Color, 49 
DUKE L.J, 1487, 1544 (2000) (noting that it can be 
difficult for a court “to believe that a person who 
hires Blacks will engage in discrimination against 
other Blacks, or that a person who is Black would 
discriminate against another Black person”).  
190
 See, e.g., Patino v. Rucker, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
29691 (2d Cir. July 25, 1997).  In this case a Puerto 
Rican porter for Columbia University alleged that he 
was discharged by his Hispanic supervisor and 
replaced with another Latino porter, in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  In granting the 
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This, of course, directly contravenes the Supreme 
Court mandate in Castaneda not to presume that intra-
ethnic and intra-racial discrimination cannot 
exist.191  Treating Latinos as interchangeable also 
denies them protection against national origin 
discrimination when the employer’s agents are Latinos 
as well.  The Supreme Court’s own definition of 
national origin as referring “to the country where a 
person was born, or, more broadly, the country from 
which his or her ancestors came,”192 conflicts with 
                                                       
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the judge 
noted that the plaintiff failed to respond to the 
defendant’s persuasive “evidence” that the plaintiff 
had previously replaced a Hispanic employee, that the 
accused supervisor was Hispanic, and that 90% of the 
employees in the department were Hispanic.  Informing 
the diversity defense in Patino is the view of the 
Hispanic category as a racial unifier that prevents 
group members from being biased against one another.  
The notion that Latinos are a racially mixed people 
may also be informing the court’s assessment. 
191
 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) 
(“[I]t would be unwise to presume as a matter of law 
that human beings of one definable group will not 
discriminate against other members of their group.”).  
192
 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 
(1973); see id. at 89 (“The only direct definition 
given the phrase ‘national origin’ is the following 
remark made on the floor of the House of 
Representatives by Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of 
the House Subcommittee which reported the bill: ‘It 
means the country from which you or your forebears 
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the way the diversity defense lumps all Latinos into 
one undifferentiated group.193  Certainly, where a 
                                                       
came.’”);  see also Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, 
C.J., concurring) (noting that a plaintiff with a 
national-origin claim must “trace ancestry to a 
nation outside of the United States” and thus a 
“Confederate Southern-American” is not a valid 
national-origin class under Title VII). But see 
Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1, 
2 - 3 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that in Puerto Rico a 
plaintiff born in the continental United States can 
assert a national-origin discrimination claim).  For 
an in-depth critique of the current limitations of 
the legal definition for national origin, see Perea, 
supra note 132, at 857 (proposing that Congress 
legislate an expansive definition of “national 
origin” that includes discrimination based upon 
ethnic traits such as alienage status and language 
preference).     
193
 See Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-
Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 69, 73 (1998) (detailing the ways 
Latinos are inappropriately depicted as a homogeneous 
group).  Symbolic homogenization is not restricted to 
Latinos.  See Aaron Celious & Daphna Oyserman, Race 
From the Inside: An Emerging Heterogeneous Race 
Model, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 149, 150 - 53 (2001) 
(describing how African Americans are often presented 
as a homogeneous group despite the ways social, 
economic, gender, and physical traits vary the racial 
experiences of different African Americans). 
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White-Anglo employer is alleged to have discriminated 
against a Latino, the binary White-Anglo-versus-
Latino context may justify the simple reference to 
the plaintiff as a “Latino” or “Hispanic” with 
standing to bring a national-origin claim.194  
However, where a Latino plaintiff from a particular 
country is alleging national-origin discrimination at 
                     
194
 It is probably for this very purpose that while 
the EEOC does not define national origin, it chooses 
to define national origin discrimination “broadly as 
including, but not limited to, the denial of equal 
employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or 
his or her ancestor’s place of origin; or because an 
individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic 
characteristics of a national origin group.”  29 
C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2007) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, at least one district court has 
permitted Latino plaintiffs to bring national-origin 
discrimination allegations based upon their “Spanish-
speaking characteristic” alone where a White-Anglo 
defendant may have had no actual knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s exact place of origin, but instituted 
policies that disparately impacted and discriminated 
based upon the foreignness of the plaintiffs.  See 
Alemendares v. Palmer, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23258, 
at *31 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2002) (“Because plaintiffs 
have linguistic characteristics of a particular 
national origin group –- as required in the EEOC’s 
definition of ‘national origin discrimination’ -– 
they have sufficiently pled a claim of national 
origin discrimination.  Plaintiffs’ Spanish-speaking 
characteristics reflect their national origin.”). 
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the hands of a Latino from another country of origin, 
it would be nonsensical to ignore the distinctions in 
country of origin.  Similarly, it would defy logic to 
presume that an employer’s preference for one Latino 
over another should insulate the employer from an 
inquiry about discriminatory intent.  Such an 
interpretation of antidiscrimination jurisprudence 
would, like the emerging diversity defense to 
discrimination, be yet another misplaced application 
of symmetry to the doctrine.195   
Supreme Court precedent should temper any 
district court inclination to presume symmetrically 
that because the replacement of a discharged racially 
excluded employee with a White employee gives rise to 
a prima facie case of discrimination,196 the 
                     
195
 See supra notes 173 - 181 and accompanying text. 
196
 A number of jurisdictions have concluded that 
proof that a protected class member has been 
unfavorably treated relative to someone not in the 
protected class can be an element of a prima facie 
case of racial discrimination.  See, e.g., Leadbetter 
v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(requiring reverse-discrimination plaintiffs to prove 
that other employees of similar qualifications who 
were not members of the protected class were more 
favorably treated in order to set forth a prima face 
case of discrimination); Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1015 (11th Cir. 
2001) (per curiam) (noting that part of establishing 
a prima facie case of discrimination is showing that 
employer either filled plaintiff’s position with a 
person not of the same racial minority or left the 
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replacement of a discharged racially excluded 
employee with another racially excluded employee is, 
in turn, proof of nondiscriminatory intent on the 
part of the employer.  In O’Connor v. Consolidated 
Coin Caterers Corp., the Supreme Court explicitly 
held in the context of age discrimination that it is 
immaterial that a statutorily protected class member 
was replaced by someone who is also a protected class 
member.197  Because O’Connor entailed a development of 
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard for 
discrimination,198 its discussion of protected class 
member replacements in the age discrimination context 
is analytically applicable to race discrimination 
cases.199 
                                                       
position open); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 516 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (requiring as an element of a prima 
facie case of discrimination proof either that 
someone not of the plaintiffs’ protected class filled 
the position or that the position remained vacant). 
197
 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (“The fact that one 
person in the protected class has lost out to another 
person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so 
long as he has lost out because of his age.”). 
198
 Id. at 312 (“Because it lacks probative value, the 
fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone 
outside the protected class is not a proper element 
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.”). 
199
 See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 
158 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying O’Connor 
to a Title VII racial discrimination case). “Laws 
against discrimination protect persons, not classes, 
the Court remarked, an observation with equal force 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 93 
 
 
Unfortunately, the treatment of Latinos of 
varying racial and ethnic backgrounds as a 
homogeneous group also adversely influences the 
analysis of the nature of Latino inter-ethnic 
discrimination that cannot be addressed by O’Connor 
alone.  For instance, the interchangeability of 
Latinos’ perspectives in Arrocha completely fails to 
appreciate the ways in which internal Latino national 
origin bias is rooted in a racialized hierarchy of 
Latin American countries, where countries perceived 
as European are viewed as more advanced than those 
more significantly populated with people of 
indigenous descent or those of African descent.200  In 
the list of countries the judge thought equivalent, 
Latin American racial constructs would rank Argentina 
as a highly valued White country, followed by Peru 
and Mexico with their indigenous populations, 
followed by the Dominican Republic and the 
plaintiff’s own country of origin, Panama, because of 
they are populated by more people of African descent.  
For Latinos influenced by Latin American racial 
paradigms where each country has a racial 
identification, a diverse workforce of Latinos is not 
the immediate equivalent of a bias-free context.  Nor 
is a color preference divorced from a racialized 
ideology within the Latino context.201  Diversity 
                                                       
in a case under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id.;  
see also Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 344, 
355 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying O’Connor to a Title VII 
gender discrimination case). 
200
 See supra notes 43 - 44 and accompanying text. 
201
 See DE GENOVA & RAMOS-ZAYAS, supra note 106, at 214 
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means something more nuanced to people of color, who 
do not view all ethnic groups as the same simply 
because they are non-White.  The public discourse 
about diversity as a panacea for racial 
discrimination overlooks the complexity of actual 
diversity.   
Part of the difficulty that judges have in 
disentangling notions of diversity from 
discrimination may stem from overlooking the 
operation of what Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati term 
“working identity.”202  Carbado and Gulati assert that 
judges utilize such a narrow conception of what race 
is that they often disregard the extent to which 
racial and ethnic discrimination manifests itself not 
                                                       
(describing how “intra-Latino divisions seem always 
to be entrenched in the hegemonic denigration of 
African Americans” and blackness). 
202
 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black 
Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 702 (2001) 
(“Understanding the relationship between 
discrimination and performance, we argue, is crucial 
to developing a plausible and coherent theory of 
discrimination.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000);  
accord Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and 
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the 
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004) 
(arguing that Title VII has been misinterpreted to 
exclude those cases in which employees are 
disparately treated based upon racially specific 
grooming choices that are integral to racial 
identity).   
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simply by a plaintiff’s membership in a protected 
class, but also by an employer’s stereotyped 
expectations about “racial conduct.”203  To be 
precise, Carbado and Gulati theorize that 
discrimination in a diverse setting can occur when 
the least racially assimilated employee or 
prospective employee is targeted for disparate 
treatment.204  One example that Carbado and Gulati 
provide is of a law school faculty inclined to 
exclude any female Asian American teaching candidate 
whose conduct does not challenge the stereotype of 
“Asian-American females as lacking authority and 
                     
203
 Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 
202, at 1262;  see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning 
a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective 
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995) 
(describing the ways in which Whites’ lack of 
consciousness of having a race disconnects them from 
recognizing the full spectrum of their racialized 
decisionmaking when assessing the conduct of 
employees who do not conform to expectations of 
racial assimilation within predominantly White 
workplaces). 
204
  
An employer that has a record of promoting 
black employees is likely to persuade a 
court that insufficient evidence of racial 
animus exists.  The court assumes that 
because the employer thinks that some 
blacks are “good,” the reason the employer 
thought the plaintiff was “bad” had nothing 
to do with the plaintiff’s race.  The court 
is likely to conclude that the reason for 
the termination was simply the employer’s 
dislike of the individual, which does not 
produce an actionable discrimination case. 
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 202, 
at 1298. 
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being quiet and submissive.”205  If the law school 
faculty were instead to hire another Asian American 
female candidate whose racial performance was more 
visibly commanding and vocal, it would not vitiate 
the disparate treatment that the faculty accorded the 
first candidate based on their unconscious 
stereotypes.  “To make this concrete, if ten black 
employees are up for promotion, and nine are 
promoted, a court should still not negate the 
possibility that the tenth was denied a promotion 
because of his race:  The other nine employees may 
have been engaged in racially palatable identity 
performances.”206  Judicial willingness to inquire 
into the possibility of discrimination in an 
individual instance of racial exclusion within an 
otherwise “diverse” workplace setting will depend 
upon jurists’ attention to what racial differences an 
employer finds acceptable and unacceptable, and the 
ways in which that calculus itself is 
discrimination.207  Certainly, the EEOC’s recent 
                     
205
 Id. at 1272. 
206
 Id. at 1298. 
207
 One example of a judge who demonstrates an 
understanding of the implications of a racial 
performance in working identity can be found in Davis 
v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., 1994 WL 714517, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 21, 1994):  
[A]n employer might tolerate outspokenness 
in his white employees but find 
objectionable a comparable lack of reserve 
by a black employee because of a feeling 
that blacks should “know their place.”  If 
his solution is to fire the outspoken black 
in favor of a more docile or reserved black 
employee, his action obviously still is 
discriminatory even though the position was 
not filled by a “non-protected class 
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settlement agreements in cases in which employers 
have categorically preferred one non-White racial 
group over another non-White racial group attests to 
the fact that employer stereotypes about preferred 
racial conduct do exist.208  It is thus not unlikely 
that employer racial conduct preferences also inform 
those diverse work settings in which an individual 
from one racial/ethnic group is disparately treated 
                                                       
member.” 
  One scholar has raised concerns about using 
employment discrimination doctrine to address issues 
of racial assimilation.  RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL 
CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 189 (2005) (concluding that an 
assimilation focus in employment discrimination 
doctrine “invites confusion as to the underlying 
purpose and practical application of disparate impact 
doctrine and ultimately ill serves the broader social 
goals of reducing underrepresentation and segregation 
in the workplace”).  Yet a singular doctrinal focus 
on proportional representation in the workplace that 
ignores questions of racial assimilation could 
ultimately undermine the goal of eradicating racially 
biased decisionmaking.  That is why Kenji Yoshino 
proposes that employer demands to “act White” be 
addressed by requiring employers to offer a rational 
reason for coercing conformity.  Yoshino in fact 
states that “covering demands are the modern form of 
subordination.”  KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT 
ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 177 (2006).  “If civil rights law 
fails to protect these groups against coerced 
conformity, it will have stopped short of its end.”  
Id. at 178. 
208
 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 98 
 
 
from an individual from another racial/ethnic group, 
such as in Arrocha. 
Unfortunately, the misconstrued application of 
diversity discourse is not limited to the isolated 
case of intra-racial bias among Latino subgroup 
members, as in Arrocha.  Although Arrocha serves as 
the paradigmatic example of all the deficiencies of 
the diversity defense, the deficiencies also manifest 
themselves in varying ways in other reported Latino 
inter-ethnic employment discrimination cases in which 
the alleged bias is instead amongst Latinos and other 
people of color (most often African Americans).  For 
example, in Sprott v. Franco,209 an African American 
woman who worked as deputy director of the New York 
City Housing Authority’s Office of Equal Opportunity 
alleged that her Hispanic supervisor harassed her and 
denied her salary increases because of her race.  In 
dismissing the plaintiff’s claim upon defendant’s 
request for summary judgment, the judge noted that 
the facts failed to raise an inference of 
discrimination because “the new Director is an 
Hispanic woman . . . .  There are now two deputy 
directors - one African-American and one Caucasian. . 
. .  The remaining staff is comprised of [sic] 
twenty-four Hispanics, twenty-three African 
Americans, nine Caucasians, and one person 
categorized as ‘other.’”210  Thus the judge accorded a 
diverse workplace and the supervisor’s Hispanic 
status great power to circumvent racism, without 
                     
209
 Sprott v. Franco, 1998 WL 472061 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 
1998) (Section 1981 employment discrimination claim). 
210
 Id. at *6. 
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questioning what diversity actually means in the new 
demographic social order.  While some judges 
mistakenly assert that the existence of a diverse 
workplace may undercut a claim about discriminatory 
hiring practices, it certainly has no relevance to a 
claim about an individual plaintiff’s racial 
harassment and pay raise disputes.  Yet this court 
conflates those two contexts in ways that seem to 
presume that Latino coworkers and diverse workplaces 
cannot be bearers of racism. 
In Bernard v. New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corp.,211 the diversity defense is raised again by a 
district court judge, albeit more subtly.  In a pro 
se application the plaintiff, a self-described dark-
skinned Black woman born in Trinidad, alleged that 
she had been terminated from her position as an 
administrative assistant because of her race, color, 
and national origin.  In dismissing her case upon 
motion for summary judgment by the defendant 
employer, the court took pains to note that the 
plaintiff’s former work environment had been an 
“ethnically diverse office” staffed predominantly by 
Hispanic and African American women.212  Although the 
plaintiff alleged several instances of negative 
interactions with her Puerto Rican manager and other 
Latina co-workers, the court was persuaded to resolve 
the dispute on summary judgment.  The court based its 
decision on the fact that the associate personnel 
director, who never previously had any contact with 
                     
211
 Bernard v. N.Y. York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 
1996 WL 457284 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996). 
212
 Id. at *2. 
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the plaintiff, independently concluded that the 
plaintiff should be terminated after reviewing all 
the records and hearing statements at a disciplinary 
meeting.  Why is this personnel director’s opinion so 
significant to the court?  The court opinion noted 
that at the disciplinary meeting “Ms. Gloria Simmons 
. . . the Associate Personnel Director, presided in 
her capacity as Labor Relations Officer . . . .  
Simmons who is black, had no contact with Bernard 
prior to the meeting.”213  As Ms. Simmons was never 
identified as a party to the discrimination, there is 
no legally relevant reason for identifying her racial 
affiliation.  Instead, the racial identification is 
situated in the opinion as a mechanism for attesting 
to the absence of any discrimination in the 
workplace.  In other words, if a Black woman found 
there was no discrimination then there could not have 
been any discrimination.  Her racial minority status 
raises her credibility and is part of the rhetorical 
understanding that diverse workplaces are somehow 
impervious to racism. 
The influence of diversity-as-antidote-to-
discrimination discourse has also surfaced in a 
defendant’s proffer of proof of nondiscriminatory 
intent.  For instance, in EEOC v. Rodriguez,214 the 
EEOC filed a pattern and practice discrimination case 
based upon an automobile dealership’s failure and 
refusal to hire African Americans as salespersons.  
The automobile dealership was owned by a man of 
                     
213
 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
214
 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1649 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 16, 1994). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 101 
 
 
Spanish and Italian ancestry.  The EEOC amassed a 
significant amount of evidence about the owner’s 
stated policy of not hiring African Americans as 
salespersons215 and his promotion of a racially 
hostile environment.216  Yet despite the wealth of 
evidence demonstrating the employer’s discriminatory 
practices, the defendant claimed he could not be 
“prejudiced” against African Americans because he had 
been the subject of discrimination himself.  He 
asserted that his own ethnic heritage as a Spaniard 
exposed him to racism and thereby inoculated him 
against being racist.  While the defense ultimately 
                     
215
 Id.  The evidence included testimony regarding 
racist commentary at the workplace, such as “I don’t 
care how good that nigger is, he will never work 
here”.  There was also testimony that other dark-
skinned ethnic group members would only be hired upon 
demonstrating they were not African American.  For 
instance, an East Indian applicant whose skin color 
was disfavorably contrasted against a dark-colored 
desk as a test for acceptable skin color was told 
that the managers might still be able to hire him 
because he was Indian and not African American.  
Similarly, a dark-skinned Mexican employee 
salesperson was saved from being fired by a manager 
who thought he was Black when another manager 
explained, “It’s ok, he’s not black, he’s Mexican.” 
216
 Id.  Sales meetings often contained verbal 
references to “niggers.”  Other racially disparaging 
terms included nigger, sand nigger, we-bes, I-be, 
large lips, fucking niggers, hey buckwheat, and hey 
boy. 
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failed amidst the significant evidence of 
discrimination, the defendant’s decision to assert 
his own ethnic diversity as a defense highlights the 
potential for continued misapplication of diversity 
discourse in employment discrimination litigation.  
F. Diversity and the “Cultural Misunderstanding” 
Dismissal of Discrimination 
If many judges in these emerging cases do not 
view inter-ethnic discrimination as actual 
discrimination, what do they believe the cases 
describe?  Two workplace narratives seem to suggest 
that decision-makers may instead read inter-ethnic 
discrimination claims as instances of mere cultural 
misunderstanding.  A July 2004 report from a human 
resources director provides a helpful illustration: 
I was called in because a small work team 
in a laboratory was not meeting deadlines 
on an important project.  On the surface it 
looked like a time management issue to 
their supervisor when in fact, two Hispanic 
employees on the team had issues that were 
culturally rooted -- one being Puerto Rican 
and the other being Dominican.  Their 
issues were getting in the way of the 
team’s progress.  While unfortunate and 
inaccurate, people who were working with 
and supervising these employees never 
thought something diversity-related was 
going on.  It never came up on their radar 
screens because they saw both employees as 
“Hispanic.”217 
This workplace case study illustrates two separate 
aspects of the opacity of inter-ethnic disputes for 
decision-makers.  First, the supervisor simply 
identifies a mere personality conflict between two 
                     
217
 Email from Manager of Learning & Organizational 
Dev., to author (July 29, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
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Latino employees because of the presumption that all 
Latinos are part of a monolithic group.  Then, the 
human resources director, who is African American and 
asserts knowledge about the existence of intra-racial 
bias within racial groups, is better able to 
appreciate that two Latinos from different ethnic 
subgroups can harbor group-based bias against one 
another.  Yet even this human resources director 
presumes that the conflict is simply “culturally 
rooted” rather than informed by Latino racial 
ideology about the “inherent racial differences” 
between Puerto Ricans and Dominicans.  Thus, even 
when a workplace identifies inter-ethnic conflicts, 
it is not necessarily equipped to appreciate that 
“culture” is not divorced from racism. 
Cultural misunderstanding was also the 
explanatory factor in entering summary judgment 
against a plaintiff in Webb v. R&B Holding Co.218  In 
Webb, an African American title clerk in a 
predominantly White-Hispanic car dealership was often 
referred to as “la negra” (the black girl) and 
reprimanded for being “rude.”219  In her complaint, 
the plaintiff noted that other employees were not 
disciplined for rude behavior.  In granting the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the judge 
chastised the plaintiff for filing the discrimination 
claim with the following reprimand: 
                     
218
 Webb v. R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. 
Fla. 1998). 
219
 The stereotyped characterization of Black women as 
rude has a long history.  See Regina Austin, Sapphire 
Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539. 
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Over the years, work environments have come 
to reflect our increasingly multi-cultural 
world.  With the coming together of 
numerous diverse ethnicities and cultures 
in the common workplace, there are bound to 
be not only many instances of cultural 
harmony but also some occasions of cultural 
friction . . . .  While this Court 
sincerely hopes that all employees of all 
cultures will choose to exercise common 
respect and courtesy, it cannot allow Title 
VII to be used as a sword by which one 
culture may achieve supremacy in the 
workplace over another” -– by filing a 
Title VII claim!220 
The judicial assumption seems to be that when Latino 
workplace disputes arise they are cultural 
misunderstandings and not rooted in racism.  This 
judicial assumption conflicts with the growing body 
of social science research discussed in Section I of 
this Article, illustrating the racial stereotypes 
that can exist within Latino communities.  What is 
needed is a mechanism for incorporating the realities 
of racial complexity demonstrated in the social 
science research into antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence.  This Article proffers a Multiracial 
Racism Litigation Approach as one possible mechanism 
for more effectively analyzing inter-ethnic 
employment discrimination cases. 
III. THE MRLA PROPOSAL:  THE MULTIRACIAL RACISM LITIGATION 
APPROACH 
How can we add nuance to the jurisprudence of 
antidiscrimination to make the new demography less 
opaque to fact-finders and assist the judiciary and 
others in identifying the new markers of racial 
discrimination?221  The first step will need to be a 
                     
220
 Webb, 992 F. Supp. at 1389 (emphasis added). 
221
 The jurisprudential problem with Latino inter-
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mechanism for developing a fuller record of inter-
ethnic racial animus across groups.  For judges who 
do not understand racial discrimination unless a 
White-Anglo person is present as an instigator or 
victim, pleadings will need to be more detailed, 
expert witnesses will need to be brought in, and 
depositions will need to be more expansive.  In 
addition, judicial training sessions will need to be 
                                                       
ethnic discrimination cases identified in this 
Article is also subject to all the pre-existing 
concerns that many scholars have described regarding 
the growing limitations on proving employment 
discrimination cases.  See, e.g., E. Christi 
Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I:  The 
Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate 
Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441 (1998) (“Lower 
courts’ reluctance to apply the Supreme Court’s 
formation of the prima facie case suggests a 
discomfort with the explicit recognition of 
historical disadvantage that the prima facie 
presumption entails.”); Samuel L. Gaertner et al., 
Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in HANDBOOK OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 377, 
393 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 
2005) (concluding that Title VII needs to be reformed 
to address in-group favoritism as a form of 
discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).  
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targeted for curriculum reform to address inter-
ethnic discrimination specifically.  But this cannot 
be done without judicial willingness to consider 
empirical data about the broader phenomenon of inter-
ethnic bias and its contravention of the diversity 
defense.   
A. The MRLA Method 
One method for facilitating the judicial 
admission of inter-ethnic specific empirical data to 
defuse the application of the diversity defense is 
the development of a “Multiracial Racism Litigation 
Approach” (“MRLA”).  The MRLA is the mechanism for 
justifying the admission of data about the details of 
a specific ethnic/racial group’s racial attitudes 
that judges might otherwise view as irrelevant to the 
judicial proceedings.  In turn, the MRLA can help 
judges to move beyond the veil of a diverse workplace 
and summary conclusions of nonactionable “cultural 
misunderstanding.”  This will then reinforce for 
judges the applicability of firmly established 
employment discrimination doctrines to the context of 
inter-ethnic discrimination. 
The term “multiracial” in Multiracial Racism 
Litigation Approach both describes the 
multiracial/multi-ethnic context of the cases and the 
ways in which multiracial contexts can be imbued with 
racism even as they are stereotyped as transcending 
race.222  Therefore, this Article will use the term  
                     
222
 See Hernández, Multiracial Matrix, supra note 37, 
at 1098 (describing the ways in which racially 
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“multiracial racism lens” to describe a conceptual 
focus on whether a defendant’s conduct is an 
assertion of racial privilege in a multiracial/multi-
ethnic diverse workplace setting.  In a nutshell, the 
MRLA suggests that inter-ethnic employment 
discrimination plaintiffs contextualize the 
discrimination they allege by:  (1) explicitly 
foregrounding the narrative with the premise of 
inter-ethnic hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the 
inquiry on whether there were racially advantaged and 
disadvantaged employees among the diverse non-White 
workers; (3) providing the social science data about 
the specific racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating 
the applicability of established employment 
discrimination doctrine to diverse workplaces. 
                                                       
diverse contexts are publicly depicted as resolving 
racial problems by transcending race).  This Article 
uses the term “multiracial” more expansively than do 
mixed-race persons using it to denote racial 
identity.  Yet the term does encompass the broader 
societal notions about the presumed racial 
enlightenment of mixed-race persons and diverse 
racial demography.  While the term 
“multiracial/multi-ethnic” is more descriptive, it is 
also more cumbersome and less apt to capture the 
racialization that occurs in the manifestation of 
animus across groups characterized as ethnic.  See 
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S (1986) (theorizing how 
the treatment of various ethnic groups in the United 
States is more accurately characterized as a series 
of “racial projects”).  
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The MRLA is not a whole new theory about the 
origins of discrimination.223  Instead, it is a tool 
for recognizing our current understandings of 
discrimination when it occurs in a multiracial or an 
inter-ethnic context.  Just as eyeglasses assist a 
person to see more clearly images that already exist, 
the multiracial racism lens clarifies the 
discrimination that can manifest in diverse 
workplaces.  It does so by focusing the pre-existing 
Title VII proof structure on the question of who is 
functionally privileged and subjugated in a given 
context and time.224  It provides needed context for 
                     
223
 See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 126 
- 78 (John J. Donohue III ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
(delineating various theories of racial prejudice and 
discriminatory conduct). 
224
 The understanding of racial privilege and 
disadvantage as fluid and thereby shifting given a 
particular context and timeframe is embodied in Eric 
Yamamoto’s concept of simultaneity.  Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, 
Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 33, 38 (1995).  Yamamoto uses simultaneity to 
describe how racially subordinated groups “contribute 
to and are responsible for the construction of their 
own identities and sometimes oppressive inter-group 
relations.”  Id.  In other words, a racialized group 
can simultaneously be subordinated and a subordinator 
of others.  Similarly, Neil Gotanda’s articulation of 
racial hierarchy incorporates the helpful perspective 
of “racial stratification” which includes the model 
of a “hierarchical structure between minorities,” 
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the application of the Title VII proof structures 
without altering them.  Plaintiffs will attempt to 
carry their traditional burden of demonstrating how 
the alleged facts amount to discrimination, but will 
do so by focusing on cultural and historical 
context.225  Defendants will still have the same 
opportunity for rebuttal by proffering a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 
employment decision, in addition to providing expert 
witnesses of their own regarding the relevant 
cultural and historical context presented by the 
                                                       
instead of a model that exclusively “emphasizes the 
subordinate position of all racial and ethnic 
minorities.”  Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and 
Racial Stratification, in MAPPING MULTICULTURALISM 238, 
240 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 
1996) (emphasis omitted).   
225
 While the MRLA recommends that litigators provide 
a more extensive narrative in their pleadings to 
include data about inter-ethnic racial animus in 
order to counteract the diversity defense, the MRLA 
does not abrogate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2).  Because the MRLA is a suggested framework 
for litigation, it does not interfere with that 
Rule’s simple mandate for a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a 
heightened pleading requirement for employment 
discrimination cases because it would conflict with 
this Rule.  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 
506, 512 (2002). 
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plaintiff.  As such, the MRLA is flexible enough to 
be applied to inter-ethnic discrimination cases that 
do not involve Latino defendants.226  Indeed, it was 
in Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan, a case not 
involving Latinos, in which a federal judge took this 
approach and came closest to demanding that 
plaintiffs utilize what this Article characterizes as 
the MRLA.227  
In Ali, a self-described light-skinned Pakistani 
citizen from the province of Punjab employed at the 
National Bank of Pakistan’s New York branch alleged 
that the Bank discriminated against him in favor of 
darker-skinned Pakistani citizens from the province 
of Sind.228  In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the 
court noted that although light-skinned employees 
predominated in the lower-paid job positions, it was 
problematic that no “evidence by way of expert 
testimony or treatise was presented with respect to 
                     
226
 While Latino inter-ethnic claims are the focus of 
this Article, the MRLA, justifying the admission of 
empirical data, should be just as helpful in 
explicating the context of non-White-Anglo/African 
American allegations of discrimination.  See, e.g., 
VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK (2000) (discussing 
the racial attitudes of Indians and their anti-Black 
racism as well).  See also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF 
PREJUDICE (1954) (describing the ubiquitous and 
historically pervasive construction of “in-groups” 
and “out-groups”).    
227
 Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
228
 Id. at 613 - 14. 
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color differences among the various provinces of 
Pakistan, or discrimination based on color.”229  The 
court was disturbed by the lack of a fuller record 
because it was unclear whether a light-skinned 
Pakistani who “is darker in complexion than those 
commonly termed white in the United States”230 
warranted “protected class status” under the 
McDonnell Douglas231 prima facie evidentiary standard.  
The court stated: 
Suffice it to note that the presumption of 
a protected class status on the basis of 
color is bound up with an entire national 
racial history.  It may well be that there 
are indigenous discriminatory practices 
around the world having nothing to do with 
the American experience.  However, there is 
no basis on this record for the recognition 
of skin color as a presumptive 
discriminatory criterion (rooted, one would 
suppose, in the intermingling of 
distinctive national or racial groups) in 
employment in Pakistan, or among Pakistanis 
in New York, under the McDonnell Douglas 
guidelines.232 
   In short, the judge is asserting that when Title 
VII cases are brought that implicate racial meanings 
beyond the U.S. setting, a fuller record about those 
meanings should be set forth in order for the 
existing legal doctrine to be applied effectively. 
B. The MRLA Benefits 
When specifically applied to the context of 
Latino inter-ethnic discrimination with its empirical 
data regarding Latino anti-Black sentiment and the 
                     
229
 Id. at 612. 
230
 Id. 
231
 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
232
 Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 613 - 14. 
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idealization of whiteness, the MRLA enables an 
inquiry into the manifestations of racial privilege 
with a focus on how a defendant’s conduct positions 
him or her as an agent of White supremacy, while not 
being viewed as racially White himself or herself.  
This is because the MRLA incorporates the 
understanding that systems and norms of White 
supremacy do not disappear simply because the census 
count of racial Whites has diminished.233  Indeed, the 
seduction of “performing whiteness” by subjugating 
others continues to exist.234  This is because 
                     
233
 See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 30 (1996) (describing the 
need for employment discrimination doctrine to 
acknowledge the importance of context in appreciating 
how “each of us lives at the juncture of privilege in 
some areas and subordination in others”); López, 
supra note 29, at 93 (1998) (describing the process 
of racialization as subject to the varying 
contingencies of time, place, and identity);  see 
also John Valery White, The Turner Thesis, Black 
Migration, and the (Misapplied) Immigrant Explanation 
of Black Inequality, 5 NEV. L.J. 6, 24, 24 - 29 (2004) 
(describing the way in which the racial diversity of 
Northern California in the 1940s, with its mixed 
population of Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, and 
Filipino residents, still maintained a system of 
White privilege that thoroughly segregated African 
Americans from most employment opportunities despite 
the absence of an official Jim Crow system).   
234
 “Performing whiteness” in its most narrow 
interpretation is when individuals assert their claim 
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to a White racial identity by evidencing “whiteness 
in their character, religious practices and beliefs, 
class orientation, language, ability to intermarry, 
and a host of other traits that [have] nothing to do 
with intrinsic racial grouping.”  John Tehranian, 
Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation 
and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 
109 YALE L.J. 817, 821 (2000) (applying Judith 
Butler’s work on gender and the performance of 
identity to the analysis of judicial evaluations of 
immigrant petitions for naturalization).  But 
performing whiteness can also refer more generally to 
the ways in which people of color engage in 
interracial distancing and attempt to “occupy both 
the marginalized and the privileged ends of the 
Black/White paradigm.”  Devon W. Carbado, Race to the 
Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1311 (2002).  In this 
way, “discrimination becomes a strategic tool 
manipulated” by one racial or ethnic group against 
another.  Louis Herns Marcelin, Identity, Power, and 
Socioracial Hierarchies Among Haitian Immigrants in 
Florida, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 4, at 
209, 223.  In addition to self-conscious attempts by 
individuals to assert a White identity or an elevated 
social status built on White privilege, there is also 
the societal dynamic of particular ethnic groups 
being offered certain facets of White privilege in 
order to lessen their interest in forming alliances 
with other racially subordinated groups.  See LANI 
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 227 (2002) (“By 
offering this option of whiteness over time to 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 114 
 
 
“intergroup conflict can [often] be best understood 
as the product of internalized white supremacy,”235 
                                                       
selected nonblack nonwhites, the racial binary of 
black and white is preserved and race in the United 
States is made more manageable for those seeking to 
hold onto zero-sum power.”).  This can take the form 
of actually incorporating new ethnic groups into the 
category of whiteness as was done with the Irish over 
time.  See NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995).  
It can also take the form of treating particular 
groups as “honorary whites” in a particular place and 
time.  See Mark Sawyer, Racial Politics in 
Multiethnic America: Black and Latina/o Identities 
and Coalitions, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS, supra note 
4, at 265, 272 (“Hollywood portrayals of [Puerto 
Rican actress Jennifer Lopez] emphasize the attempt 
to portray Latinas/os as ‘potential whites.’”); Frank 
H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian Americans and 
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 226 & 
249 (1995) (using the concepts of “honorary whites” 
and “constructive blacks” to describe the public 
discourse about affirmative action and the attempt to 
dissuade Asian Americans of their common interests 
with African Americans).  Some scholars assert that 
Latinos are particularly predisposed to being 
“seduced into thinking [they] are White.”  Enid 
Trucio-Haynes, Why “Race Matters:” Latcrit Theory and 
Latina/o Racial Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 1 (2001). 
235
 Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: 
Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American 
Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the 
Black/White Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 75 
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and the search for group-based status production.236  
Accordingly, the MRLA seeks to infuse the analysis of 
inter-ethnic discrimination claims with the 
fundamental understanding that acts of racial 
discrimination preserve racial privilege for whoever 
is situated as racially valued in any given context, 
and that such bias also furthers systemic White 
privilege more generally, regardless of whether a 
self-identified White-Anglo person is directly 
involved.237   
For example, legal scholars who analyzed the 
1992 Los Angeles riots have noted the way in which 
both Koreans and African Americans were alternatively 
positioned as functionally White-privileged in 
nativist constructs of the racial conflict in the 
public discourse.238  Korean Americans were described 
                                                       
(1997). 
236
 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The 
Economics of Group Status Production and Race 
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995) 
(theorizing that individuals are driven in part by 
their competition for esteem and that racist behavior 
is a process by which one racial group seeks to 
produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of 
another group). 
237
 See WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 33 (emphasizing the 
need for employment discrimination doctrine to 
include issues of privilege in its traditional 
examination of subordination). 
238
 See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians 
Black?:  The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and 
the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 116 
 
 
as immigrant foreigners in opposition to African 
Americans with “White” U.S. citizenship, a 
description that alternated with the description of 
Korean Americans as pursuing the American 
entrepreneurial dream as Whites in opposition to 
African Americans as a socially problematic Black 
underclass.239  The MRLA can recognize the White 
privilege of non-White groups in varying contexts.240  
Rather than introducing further complexity into 
employment discrimination cases, the MRLA builds upon 
the knowledge judges already have about the operation 
of White privilege and provides a language for 
describing its manifestation in non-White contexts.241  
                                                       
Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2398 (1999). 
239
 Id. 
240
 See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-
Semitism?  How Social Science Theories Identify 
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between 
“Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 406 
(2000) (“[W]e need to know the definition of the 
ingroup in a given context. . . .”). 
241
 Scholars have observed that trial judges in 
antidiscrimination cases are disinclined to consider 
the complexity of racial identity categories.  See 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and 
Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 629, 644 (2002).  The advantage of the MRLA is 
that it builds upon pre-existing judicial knowledge 
about White racial privilege.  It seeks to elucidate 
the dynamics of inter-ethnic discrimination by 
grounding its analysis in the operation of racial 
privilege rather than the particularities of how a 
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In addition, the vast literature regarding the 
legacies of colonialism and postcolonial racial 
stratification in multiracial societies around the 
world gives further context to the premise of racial 
privilege in multiracial/multi-ethnic societies.242  
Another advantage of the MRLA is that it can identify 
who is functionally privileged in a given context, 
without losing sight of the continuing privilege of 
self-identified White-Anglos.243  Thus, it does not 
make the mistake of recasting White-Anglos “as just 
another [racial] group competing with many others.”244  
In this way, the focus on inter-ethnic disparate 
treatment claims need not undermine the need to 
continue enforcing discrimination claims against 
White-Anglo defendants.  Similarly, the MRLA is not 
meant to subvert the enforcement of disparate impact 
claims, nor should it diminish an employer’s desire 
to foster a diverse workplace.245  
                                                       
party to the case racially identifies. 
242
 See, e.g., COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A 
READER (Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994).  
243
 Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 233, at 36 (“Privileging of 
whiteness in the workplace can occur even when all 
participants are African American.”). 
244
 Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: 
Equal Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority 
Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1995) 
(concluding that the Supreme Court’s current equal 
protection doctrine exploits the changing racial 
demography of the United States to transform Whites 
rhetorically into a victim group like any other).  
245
 Because this first wave of Latino inter-ethnic 
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While the multiracial racism lens is an 
                                                       
employment discrimination cases have all been 
litigated as individual disparate treatment claims, 
this Article focuses upon the judicial 
misunderstandings that arise in that context.  More 
empirical data is needed before an assessment can be 
made as to whether diverse workplaces also alter the 
judicial application of traditional disparate impact 
doctrine.  Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the 
MRLA may have some utility for plaintiffs attempting 
to prove that an employer’s proffered justification 
for the employment practice in question is a pretext 
for discrimination.  For instance, in EEOC v. 
Consolidated Services, 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993), 
the court noted the persuasiveness of the employer’s 
expert witness in explaining the cultural factors 
that would encourage a Korean-owned business to hire 
mostly Korean workers to the exclusion of African 
American workers.  If the plaintiff EEOC had deployed 
the MRLA, it too could have proffered expert 
testimony about the pre-existing racial attitudes of 
Koreans informing the alleged employment practice of 
word-of-mouth recruitment.  In short, for those 
inter-ethnic discrimination plaintiffs able to 
aggregate the statistical evidence to show a 
disparate impact upon their racial or ethnic subgroup 
from a particular employment practice, the MRLA may 
further support the plaintiff’s case rather than 
undermine it.  Similarly, the MRLA does not undermine 
diversity in the workplace or to dispute the 
overarching value of diversity in the workplace.  See 
supra notes 138 - 139 and accompanying text. 
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analytical approach that litigators will need to 
persuade judges to consider, it is not one that 
requires the enactment of new laws or other 
legislative reform.246  Rather, it is a conceptual 
framework that plaintiffs can use to displace the 
judicial inclination towards the diversity defense 
and its disregard for established legal doctrine.  
For instance, if the paradigmatic case of Arrocha v. 
CUNY,247 discussed in Part II of this Article, had 
been crafted by the plaintiff using the proposed 
MRLA, the court would not have summarily dismissed 
the plaintiff’s claims of race and national-origin 
discrimination, because the plaintiff would have been 
better able to dispel the judicial enchantment with 
                     
246
 In fact, the request for a judicial inquiry into 
who is functionally advantaged and disadvantaged in a 
specific racial hierarchy resonates with the post - 
Civil War judicial assessments of who was 
functionally White or Black for purposes of Jim Crow 
segregation enforcement.  See, e.g., Gong Lum v. 
Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (concluding that a child of 
Chinese descent was functionally “colored” and thus 
not qualified to enroll in Whites-only public 
schools);  see also IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 1996).  Although official Jim Crow 
segregation has been abolished, racial hierarchies 
continue as does the need to address the differential 
employment status of those racially privileged and 
racially disadvantaged. 
247
 Arrocha v. CUNY, 2004 WL 594981 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 
2004). 
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diversity rhetoric by:  (1) explicitly foregrounding 
his narrative with the premise of inter-ethnic 
hierarchy and bias; (2) focusing the inquiry on 
whether there were racially advantaged and 
disadvantaged employees among the diverse non-White 
workers; (3) providing the social science data about 
Latino racial attitudes; and (4) demonstrating the 
applicability of established employment 
discrimination doctrine to diverse workplaces.  In 
Arrocha, the plaintiff’s statement that there was a 
“disturbing culture of favoritism that favor[ed] the 
appointments of white Cubans, Spaniards, and white 
Hispanics from South America” was insufficient to 
invoke the long legacy of racial hierarchy in Latin 
America.248  For a judge focused on an understanding 
of discrimination as solely a U.S. White/non-White 
phenomenon, the Arrocha plaintiff needed to present  
explicit documentation of racial privilege and bias 
in non-White contexts.  Using the insights of the 
multiracial racism lens, the plaintiff would have 
been more likely to persuade the judge to consider 
the empirical data about Latino racial attitudes and 
their manifestation.  The plaintiff’s submission of 
expert testimony regarding the long legacy of anti-
Black bias against Afro-Latinos within Latin America 
would have dispelled the judicial inclination to view 
Latinos as homogeneous and interchangeable.  In turn, 
the disruption of the judicial presumption of Latino 
homogeneity would have eliminated the rationalization 
that “[d]iversity in an employer’s staff undercuts an 
                     
248
 Id. at *7. 
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inference of discriminatory intent.”249  Further, 
established employment discrimination doctrine would 
not have been overlooked.  Similarly, in other Latino 
inter-ethnic discrimination cases in which the 
plaintiffs are African American, the presentation of 
empirical information about Latino anti-Black bias 
would be useful in dismantling fanciful notions about 
the inherent harmony of a diverse workplace.  
Furthermore, the scholarly literature explaining how 
systemic White privilege encourages non-White 
racial/ethnic group members to harbor bias against 
other non-Whites would also be useful.250 
                     
249
 Id. 
250
 See supra note 234; see also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, 
WHITE MASKS 10 - 30 (Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove 
Press 1967) (describing how subordinated group 
members can internalize the biases of the privileged 
class and thereby adopt disdain for other 
subordinated group members).  In contrast, when the 
EEOC files class actions alleging that an employer 
has privileged a particular racial/ethnic group in 
order to exclude another racial/ethnic group in its 
employment decisions, it may instead find the 
scholarly literature regarding the strategic 
positioning of “middleman minorities” more useful for 
informing a judge.  See, e.g., HUBERT BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD 
A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 79 – 84 (1967); Edna 
Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. 
SOC. REV. 583, 584 (1973).  This separate body of 
literature may be more useful because it focuses upon 
a White privileged-class interest in favoring one 
racial/ethnic group over another.  In contrast, the 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 122 
 
 
The MRLA is a concept influenced by Charles 
Lawrence’s articulation of a “cultural meaning test.”  
In a 1987 Stanford Law Review article, he proposed 
the overt judicial examination of context as a method 
for recognizing racial meanings and motivations.251  
Lawrence proposed the cultural meaning test as a 
mechanism for helping judges address the harm of 
unconscious racism in the equal protection context.  
Lawrence suggested that judges look to the cultural 
meaning of an allegedly discriminatory governmental 
act as a method for identifying unconscious racism 
that should be addressed and subjected to strict 
scrutiny.  This could be done by considering evidence 
regarding the historical and social context in which 
a governmental decision was made. 
Because Lawrence’s analysis focused on the 
racial subordination of African Americans, his 
articulation of the cultural meaning test relies upon 
the usefulness of considering whether a significant 
portion of the population views a particular action 
                                                       
internalized racism literature focuses upon the 
racialized attitudes of non-White racial/ethnic group 
members and is thus more applicable to establishing a 
framework for understanding employment discrimination 
cases in which non-Whites are the identified agents 
of discrimination in a workplace dominated by non-
Whites. 
251
 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 - 81 (1987) (using cognitive 
theory to develop a cultural meaning test for 
addressing the social harms of unconscious racism). 
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as being of racial import.252  In contrast, the MRLA 
concerns itself with the racial and ethnic 
discrimination of which much of the population in the 
United States may very well be ignorant.  
Accordingly, the MRLA instead encourages the search 
for cultural meaning that is outside of the U.S. Jim 
Crow racial history but serves as its functional 
equivalent for understanding racial subordination in 
the inter-ethnic context.  
While no court has ever directly referenced the 
Charles Lawrence cultural meaning test,253 “much of 
                     
252
 Id. at 356. 
253
 Courts thus far have only cited Lawrence’s article 
for its discussion of unconscious racism rather than 
to apply the proposed cultural meaning test.  See, 
e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 332 – 333 
(1987); Crum v. Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1321 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 
61 (1st Cir. 1999); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 
1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bishop, 
959 F.2d 820, 827 - 28 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 (10th Cir. 1989); Chin v. 
Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 
1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Dobbs-Weinstein v. 
Vanderbilt Univ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 783, 801 (M.D. Tenn. 
1998); United States v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205, 
208 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Clary, 846 F. 
Supp. 768, 778 - 79 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Harris v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 - 16  (D. Me. 
1991); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 503 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987); Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State, 
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what judges do entails this kind of interpretation:  
It requires the same skills they employ when they 
decide a case by characterizing or interpreting a 
line of precedent in the way that seems most true to 
them.”254  Moreover, at least one Supreme Court case 
implicitly supports the search for cultural meaning 
in the manner proposed by the MRLA.  In St. Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court was presented with 
the question of whether a person of Arabian ancestry 
born in Iraq has standing to seek protection from 
racial discrimination under the Section 1981 mandate 
against racial discrimination in the making of 
private and public contracts.255  The Court refused to 
decide the case on the fact that under current racial 
classifications Arabs are Caucasians and thus 
precluded from raising a Section 1981 claim that they 
are not treated like “white citizens.”256  Instead, 
                                                       
110 P.3d 947, 963 (Alaska 2005); State by Beaulieu v. 
City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 575 (Minn. 
1994). 
254
 Lawrence, supra note 251, at 362.  “If the 
jurisprudential task is to give sense to broad 
propositions of law -- deriving that sense from an 
ongoing judicial interpretation of culturally created 
moral norms -- then application of the proposed 
cultural meaning test is clearly within the courts’ 
competence.”  Id. at 386. 
255
 St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 
(1987). 
256
 Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination that 
denies individuals the same rights “as [are] enjoyed 
by white citizens.”  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
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the Court held that: 
Based on the history of § 1981, we have 
little trouble in concluding that Congress 
intended to protect from discrimination 
identifiable classes of persons who are 
subjected to intentional discrimination 
solely because of their ancestry or ethnic 
characteristics.  Such discrimination is 
racial discrimination that Congress 
intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not 
it would be classified as racial in terms 
of modern scientific theory.257   
In effect, the Court looked beyond the attempts at 
formalizing what constitutes a racial group for 
coverage under discrimination law, and instead sought 
to have the law address the reality of racial 
discrimination in our more racially and ethnically 
diverse society.  It did this by recognizing that 
those often viewed racially as Caucasian, as was the 
St. Francis College plaintiff, can also be treated as 
non-White depending upon the context.258  The MRLA 
proposed here would extend that analysis to 
recognizing how those often viewed as racially non-
White can still exert White privilege in various 
                     
257
 481 U.S. at 613. 
258
 St. Francis College has been relied on to 
recognize that Jews, Iranians, and Italians can be 
protected from racial discrimination under Section 
1981 even though they are today racially classified 
as Caucasian.  See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. 
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (recognizing Jews as 
protected under Section 1981); Amini v. Oberlin 
Coll., 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
Iranians as protected under Section 1981); Bisciglia 
v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 45 F.3d 223 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (recognizing Italians as protected under 
Section 1981). 
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contexts. 
In order to be able to examine an employment 
context for racial discrimination in a richer 
demographic workforce, the MRLA will entail an 
engagement with the particularities of how various 
racial and ethnic groups have historically treated 
and continue to stereotype one another.  For 
instance, in the context of Latino inter-ethnic 
discrimination claims, plaintiffs’ lawyers would have 
available to them a vast literature on Latino 
Studies259 and Ethnic Studies260 with which to 
understand and present such claims.  Such literature 
would be especially useful in the context of Latino 
inter-ethnic discrimination claims as a mechanism to 
remedy the ill-informed characterizations of Latino 
racial attitudes that currently pervade the public 
discourse and unconsciously influence judges and 
other legal decision-makers.261  Legal scholars 
                     
259
 See Pedro A. Cabán, Moving from the Margins to 
Where?  Three Decades of Latino/a Studies, 1 LATINO 
STUD. 5 (2003) (describing the evolution of Latino 
Studies). 
260
 See generally INTRODUCTION TO ETHNIC STUDIES:  A READER 
(Phillip Q. Yang ed., 1999). 
261
 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism:  
Judicial Conduct and New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 - 25 (2000) 
(articulating a theory of “institutional racism” to 
explain how judges can unconsciously follow elaborate 
social scripts that manifest prejudice and racism 
without a conscious intent to discriminate);  see 
also LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES 
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Laurens Walker and John Monahan describe this process 
as the admission of empirical information to 
construct a frame of reference for deciding factual 
issues.262  While this is a form of judicial notice 
that involves neither legislative facts nor 
adjudicative facts as contemplated in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201, “a growing number of courts have held 
that the use of social frameworks to correct beliefs 
that are erroneous does indeed ‘assist the trier of 
fact.’”263  This is because the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not bar this third use of social science 
in law,264 thereby allowing a court to admit empirical 
information “to keep it responsive to its changing 
environment.”265 
Judges customarily admit empirical information 
through the use of expert witnesses for the purpose 
of assisting a trier of fact to understand the 
evidence.266  For instance, judges have accepted the 
                                                       
ROUTINE  135 - 37 (2006) (describing how discrimination 
in the legal system can occur by default, due to 
legal actors’ unconscious biases and resort to 
automatic racial stereotypes). 
262
 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: 
A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 
570 (1987) (defining social framework as “the use of 
general conclusions from social science research in 
determining factual issues in a specific case”).   
263
 Id. at 580. 
264
 Id. at 582. 
265
 E.F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of 
Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210, 210 (1967). 
266
 Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 583.     
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 128 
 
 
presentation of expert testimony on the deployment of 
racial stereotypes in the workplace in order to 
disabuse fact-finders of what they believe is “common 
sense.”267  In Walker v. State, a law professor 
provided expert testimony on behalf of an African 
American state trooper alleging discriminatory 
discharge.268  The testimony was based on research in 
the literature of racial stereotyping that permitted 
the expert witness to conclude that it was extremely 
likely that the plaintiff was the victim of race-
based performance evaluations.  Expert testimony will 
be especially useful in delineating how Latinos and 
other populations of color racialize one another.269  
Such information would be presented for the sole 
purpose of creating a social framework to construct a 
frame of reference for deciding the factual issues, 
and not as a vehicle for imparting a general group 
bias to an individual defendant on the legal question 
of discriminatory intent.270  In this way, the MRLA 
                     
267
 SPRIGGS, supra note 145, § 17.03[3][g].   
268
 No. EV 87-12-C (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 1987). 
269
 See WANG supra note 261, at 136 - 37 (explaining 
that one way to counteract a factfinder’s unconscious 
biases is to present more normative clarity about the 
role of race in the case). 
270
 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (authorizing the use of expert 
witnesses with specialized knowledge to “assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence”); see also 
JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 at 50 (1992) 
(“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit 
opinion on law except questions of foreign law . . . 
.”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: 
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will call on expert witnesses to act in their 
traditional role of educating the decision-maker 
about their areas of expertise.271  One federal 
district court has already been very explicit about 
the need for such expert testimony and literature.272  
As discussed earlier in this section, Ali v. National 
Bank of Pakistan represents what is sure to become a 
growing dynamic of cases presenting judges with 
inter-ethnic discrimination claims that they are 
unable to assess and evaluate without in-depth 
assistance from the plaintiff.273  It is at least 
encouraging that the judge in Ali expressed a 
willingness to receive expert testimony and 
documentation about systems of racialization with 
which he was not familiar.  It is in such spaces of 
willingness that the multiracial racism lens concept 
may gain traction in the same manner that some judges 
                                                       
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 7.7 at 905 (2d ed. 1999) 
(“[When] parties offer expert testimony on the 
content of law during the ordinary course of trial, 
it is properly rejected.”). 
271
 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 270, § 7.6 at 902 
(“Often the best thing an expert can do is to provide 
standards or criteria, estimates of feasibility or 
likelihood, or descriptions of social frameworks that 
juries can then constructively use in resolving more 
particular issues relating to such things a due care, 
intent or purpose, and who likely did what and why.”) 
(emphasis added). 
272
 See Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
273
 See supra notes 228 - 232 and accompanying text. 
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have implicitly and explicitly applied Critical Race 
Theory in their analysis of social issues.274  Once 
the judiciary is made more aware of the existence of 
inter-ethnic discrimination expertise, judges may 
become more disposed to exercising their discretion 
to appoint expert witnesses themselves.275  In 
addition to using expert witnesses, empirical 
research can be presented in briefs, and later in the 
proposal for jury instructions.276  Over time a set of 
pattern jury instructions could be developed to 
standardize the use of a set of social science 
findings.277  This will in turn become useful for 
those plaintiffs financially unable to obtain expert 
                     
274
 See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
AN INTRODUCTION 109 - 19 (2001) (describing some cases 
in which judges have either explicitly or implicitly 
used Critical Race Theory in their opinions). 
275
 See FED. R. EVID. 706 (“[T]he court may on its own 
motion or on the motion of any party enter an order 
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be 
appointed . . . and may appoint expert witnesses of 
its own selection . . . .”). 
276
 Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 588.  The 
model for inserting empirical information into legal 
memoranda is the “Brandeis brief.”  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 98 (5th ed. 1983) (“Form of appellate brief 
in which economic and social surveys and studies are 
included along with legal principles and citations 
and which takes its name from Louis D. Brandeis, 
former Associate Justice of Supreme Court, who used 
such briefs while practicing law.”).  
277
 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 262, at 597 - 98. 
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witnesses of their own.  Given the longstanding use 
of statistical empirical data in employment 
discrimination cases to provide context for an 
allegation of discrimination, judges should be 
amenable to the presentation of other forms of 
empirical data as well. 
With respect to Latino inter-ethnic 
discrimination claims, plaintiffs will need not only 
to develop the record with regard to Latino racial 
biases, but also to countermand the misleading public 
discourse that currently exists about Latinos and 
race.278  Specifically, much of the public discourse 
about Latinos and racism has focused on the depiction 
of a problematic relationship between Latinos and 
African Americans and has presented Latinos as racial 
innocents incapable of racial discrimination.279  
                     
278
 See Sawyer, supra note 234, at 270 (discussing how 
the public emphasis placed on “Latinas/os as 
representative of a new mixed-race America is meant 
to distance Latinas/os from Blacks and to redefine 
race in U.S. society as a concept not so very 
different from the Latin American myth of racial 
democracy, which effectively denies racism by 
emphasizing miscegenation”). 
279
 See, e.g., NICOLÁS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE:  THE 
UNSPOKEN CONFLICT BETWEEN LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR 
AMERICA (2004) (presenting race relations between 
African Americans and Latinos as unharmonious because 
of the resentment African Americans are presumed to 
have for Latinos).  But see Sawyer, supra note 234, 
at 270 (describing how authors like Vaca 
“overemphasize differences between Latinas/os and 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 132 
 
 
Given the fact that the vast majority of reported 
Latino inter-ethnic claims to date involve claims of 
anti-Black bias, it is especially important to have a 
more complete picture of Latino racial attitudes as 
described in Part I of this Article.  The value of 
the MRLA, with its attention to racial hierarchy and 
privilege in diverse workplace settings, is that it 
validates the need to submit empirical information to 
expand the judicial understanding of how employment 
discrimination is manifested amidst workplace 
diversity. 
Because of the long legacy of White/non-White 
racism in the United States, discussion of race has 
rightly focused on the White/non-White paradigm of 
U.S. race relations and its effects on civil rights 
enforcement.  But the changing demographics of the 
United States mean that we need to expand the 
judicial analysis of racism to include considerations 
of how groups of color can be complicit and even 
active agents in discrimination against other groups 
of color.  Accordingly, the national dialogue about 
race needs to examine each ethnic group’s racial 
attitudes in order to have a complete picture of race 
relations in today’s United States, and of the 
growing dynamic of inter-ethnic civil rights claims.  
The failure to address the interplay of diversity 
discourse and inter-ethnic discrimination claims will 
undermine the social importance of equality in the 
                                                       
African American and ignore political and ideological 
convergences . . . [and also] overemphasize conflict 
in the service of an assimilationist political 
agenda”). 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art36
Hernández (CRCL)  01/26/09 9:45 AM Page 133 
 
 
workplace.280  Allowing diversity discourse to proceed 
unchecked in employment discrimination cases will 
leave open the very concrete possibility that 
employers will begin to construct their workplaces as 
“diverse” to ward off lawsuits, while simultaneously 
maintaining a racial hierarchy.281  The MRLA proposed 
here is but one possible method for more effectively 
navigating the realities of racism in a multiracial 
world.  The concept seeks to focus judges on the 
applicability of established employment 
                     
280
 Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: 
Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 
1272 (2006) (“The black-white binary paradigm of race 
thus requires expansion to deal with our increasingly 
multicultural, multiracial society -- and even, 
sometimes, to do justice to the black cause.”). 
281
 See Carl G. Cooper, Diversity: Denied, Deferred or 
Preferred, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 685, 687 (2005) (“[A] 
diverse workforce cuts down on litigation.  It is 
very difficult when you have all groups, all racial 
groups and all kinds of individuals, sexual 
orientation, disability, age, all employed by the 
same employer to mount a successful discrimination 
lawsuit.”). 
[A]n anecdotal example is the statement of a 
Filipino American who, in a recent 
interview, said that she and other Asian 
Americans are promoted to and kept at low 
management positions so that they can do the 
face-to-face firing of African Americans and 
Latino employees, thereby immunizing their 
employers from Title VII suits; after all, 
how can one racial minority illegally 
discriminate against another? 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice 
Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495, 
497 (1997). 
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discrimination doctrine to the context of inter-
ethnic discrimination.  Such an endeavor is 
imperative if inter-ethic discrimination allegations 
are to receive the full inquiry that they deserve. 
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